This paper analyses typical situations which exist before and after an election.
First, the incumbent and his or her challenger make choices that affect the
election results. Second, the election itself determines who wins. Third, the
loser may or may not accept defeat. If the defeat is not accepted, either a standoff
or a coalition between the incumbent and challenger follows. We assume that
the incumbent directs his or her resources into the following activities,
which affect the chance of winning an election: production, fighting with
the challenger, and providing public goods. Similarly, the challenger directs
his or her resources into production and fighting with the incumbent. We
examine six possible election outcomes based on whether the incumbent wins,
the challenger wins, and whether a standoff or coalition arises after either
one of the players wins. We draw conclusions about the effect of the various
choices which the incumbent and challenger make. Our analysis is mapped
to and tested against empirical data from 51 African elections held between
2006 and 2011 (including one in Eritrea in 1993), which are classified
into the six outcomes. A variety of regression results are determined. For
example, the current empirical material shows that the election outcome
depends crucially on fighting between the incumbent and challenger, and
less on public goods provision to the population.