Theories and Models of Party Funding
Political party funding occupies a pivotal position in the democratisation process globally, particularly in the Global South, and especially in Africa. It plays a critical role in shaping the organisation of political competition. Yet it also poses risks of inequality, state capture, and corruption. In this article, we analyse party funding as a regime-dependent political process. Our central thesis is that the design, operation, and effects of party finance systems must be understood within the broader political context, particularly in terms of regime typologies. The study follows a qualitative methodology based on desk research. We collected and analysed secondary data from published works and online sources. While cognisant of a multiplicity of regime-typology frameworks, we utilise two, namely, the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index and the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. Our analysis situates African political regimes along a democracy–autocracy continuum. We examine how variations in regimes and their accountability can shape incentives for party funding as well as outcomes. The study is anchored in two analytically contrasting theories, public goods theory and clientelist theory. These theories illuminate contrasting logics of political finance under different regime typologies. Using the selected frameworks, we assess five major party funding models as politically embedded arrangements rather than neutral institutional choices.