

CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE

A promise betrayed

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the performance of the recently formed Congress of the People (Cope) in the 2009 elections. It traces the origins of the organisation, probes its electoral strategies and provides insight into the internal challenges Cope encountered. The paper contends that Cope sought not only to envelop itself with the symbolism of liberation politics but also to transcend that by appealing to other constituencies that had not historically supported the liberation movement. This meant adopting policies that were not only targeted at the middle class but were also trans-racial. Ultimately, though, Cope's appeal was undercut by, among other factors, the persistent salience of racial inequality and excessive reliance on political activity as a source of income rather than a pursuit of principles. The article further argues that incidents related to the party also shone a light on the indifference of the business sector to competitive electoral politics and on the way the ruling party has blurred the distinction between itself and public institutions.

INTRODUCTION

The results of the 22 April 2009 elections were awaited with an unusual level of anticipation. Unlike in the three previous elections, this time round the hitherto dominant incumbent political party, the African National Congress (ANC), entered the elections reeling from a split. Four months earlier, long-serving and senior leaders had left the organisation to form a new political party, the Congress of the People (Cope). In light of the similarity of their leadership credentials and public standing Cope promised to vie for support from the same constituency as the ANC, thus potentially making South Africa's electoral process a lot more competitive than it had ever been since 1994.

This chapter analyses Cope's electoral performance. Some scholarly attention has been given to this subject, notably by Susan Booysen and Janet Cherry (in Southall & Daniel 2009). While treating some similar issues to those of the two scholars, this article provides new details and goes further, profiling the constituencies in which Cope received the most and the least support with a view to understanding the voters' rationale. In particular, the chapter contends that the tone of Cope's electoral campaign and its electoral returns shed light on the feasibility of trans-racial politics and on the relationship between business and electoral democracy, and that between the ruling liberation movement and public institutions. The article thus contends that the support Cope received is more than just a verdict on its electoral strategies or the extent of its popular appeal, it is also a reflection on the broader society, especially the elements that constitute South Africa's body politic.

THE RISE OF COPE: 'REINCARNATION OF THE REAL ANC'

Cope sprang into existence on 16 December 2007, claiming descent from the pre-2007 ANC. Cope founders – Mosioua Lekota, Mbhazima Shilowa and Mluleki George – not only made this claim buoyed by a sense of ownership of an organisation they had served for many years but also as a statement of intent to continue ANC traditions, as would be expected of any offspring. Explicit in that claim was the assertion that what had become of the ANC after the 2007 National Conference at Polokwane was a deviation from the 'real ANC'. Founding Cope president, former ANC chairperson and Cabinet minister in Thabo Mbeki's successive cabinets, Lekota explained the charge as he elaborated on his reasons for leaving the organisation he had served for his entire adult life, in an open letter dated 2 October 2008:

... the leadership has taken a direct and unadulterated departure from the Freedom Charter by calling for a political solution in the matter of the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions vs. President of the ANC. What happened to 'There shall be equality before law'? Or are we now to have political solutions to every citizen's criminal case?

www.politicsweb.co.za

Thabo Mbeki, in a letter addressed to Jacob Zuma and dated 31 October 2008, about a month after Mbeki had effectively been dismissed as president of the Republic by the ruling party, to which he had dedicated 52 years of his then 66 years of life, echoed Lekota's charge:

... I find it strange in the extreme that today cadres of our movement ... publicly declare a determination 'to kill' to defend your own cause, the personal interests of 'the personality', Jacob Zuma!

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Mbeki went on to remind Zuma that they had both:

... grown up in a political atmosphere that we fully respected and honoured our leaders, heroes and heroines without reservation ... However, for me personally, at no point did this translate into hero-worship and therefore the progression to the phenomenon of the 'cult of personality'.

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All the leaders he had served with in the ANC, Mbeki elaborated, 'would have opposed the emergence of such a cult with every fibre in their revolutionary bones!'. The fact that Zuma had not opposed it but had allowed himself to be the subject of such a phenomenon, Mbeki implied, was a deviation from the established tradition of leadership. In other words, and according to Mbeki, Zuma was, effectively, not worthy of the mantle of leadership of the ANC (or of the Republic for that matter).

Inevitably, having claimed to be the reincarnation of the 'true' ANC, it thus followed that the defectors would envelop the new party with the symbolism of liberatory politics. This was evident in the activities leading to Cope's formation, the choice of both the site of the party's birth and the date, and the very name it chose.

The founding conference was preceded by a public gathering on 1 November 2008 in the Sandton Convention Centre north of Johannesburg. Dubbed the 'South African National Convention' the convention was reportedly attended by more than 5 000 people from across the country and various stations in life at their own cost – the crowd exceeded the 4 500 capacity of the venue and some who attended gathered outside clamouring for entry (www.news24.com).

It was there that a formal resolution to form a new political party was taken, as Shilowa, a convener of the gathering, declared: 'I stand here today on behalf of this preparatory committee to say not only do we intend to tackle it [the ANC], we intend to win the next election' (*Mail & Guardianonline* 1 November 2008). The new party formation, the convention declared, would be anchored primarily in the supremacy of the Constitution and judicial equality.

The enthusiastic turnout for the convention effectively cast Cope's eventual formation as a grassroots-inspired formation rather than an elite-driven initiative.

The very idea of organising a convention prior to forming a political party was to define Cope in the public imagination as the embodiment of the aspirations of ordinary folk. The irony of a supposedly 'people's movement' formed in one of South Africa's wealthiest areas did not seem bothersome, as evidenced by the overwhelming attendance. At its founding, on 16 December 2008, the party's organisational report, distributed at the conference, claimed 428 000 paid-up members.

The symbolism of a people's movement stretched to the location and date of the party's formation. Though it is convenient because of its central location, the choice of Bloemfontein for the founding conference, and the date – 16 December – seemed to be geared to exploiting the town's historical association with the founding and the historiography, of the national liberation movement. It was there that the ANC was founded in 1912, while its military wing, UmKhonto We Sizwe (MK) was officially formed on 16 December 1960. The date 16 December is thus mythologised in black historiography as it marked the beginning of military resistance to apartheid. To be sure, in choosing that date for its founding, MK founders, too, were exploiting its historical association with resistance against colonial conquest.

While 16 December had been celebrated by pre-1994 officialdom as the Day of the Covenant, 'Africans', as Nelson Mandela put it, 'mourned this day of the massacre of their people'.¹ MK had selected that date as Mandela, the initial commander-in-chief of MK, explained: 'to show that the African had only begun to fight and that we had righteousness – and dynamite – on our side' (Mandela 1994, p 275). Invoking the memory of King Dingane, and other warrior kings, served both as inspiration for military resistance and to create a link between the post-1960 guerilla warfare and the 19th-century anti-colonial wars of resistance. The intention was to confer popular legitimacy upon the latter-day freedom fighters as heirs of that long, heroic tradition of resistance, whose narratives have always been a source of pride and inspiration to the African community.

The choice of the name for the new party, Congress of the People, was even more obvious in its claim to the legacy of the anti-apartheid struggle. The name derived from a historic mass multiracial gathering in 1955 which adopted the much-revered and popular document, the Freedom Charter. The charter, based

1 The 'covenant' refers to a vow that was taken by Voortrekkers following the killing of some of their own, including Piet Retief, by the Zulu King Dingane in February 1838, that if God ever gave them strength to avenge those killings they would build a church in commemoration of that victory. That day of vengeance came months later, on 16 December 1838, as Voortrekkers defeated Zulus in what later came to be known as the Battle of Blood River, in reference to the site of the war – a tributary of the Buffalo River which was renamed Blood River after the battle had been won. Thenceforth Voortrekkers and their descendants (Afrikaners) celebrated 16 December as the 'Day of the Covenant' (See De Klerk 1999).

on popular input, which outlined the people's vision of what a post-apartheid South Africa should look like (Karis & Carter 1977), was eventually adopted by the ANC as its policy blueprint for a future South Africa. In adopting the historic name Congress of the People the new party was implying that its formation was analogous to that historic multiracial gathering called to imagine a different future for South Africa.

Cope thus located itself within the memory of liberation politics. Although it was a new entity it presented itself as a continuation of the emancipatory project while also seeking to transcend that tradition. It emphasised socioeconomic transformation, but downplayed race as a criterion in favour of a trans-racial orientation.

ELECTORAL PLATFORM AND STRATEGIES

Under the slogan 'A New Agenda for Change and Hope for All' Cope made morality, constitutionalism, and meritocracy the centrepiece of its election strategy. The party not only intended to illuminate a contrast between itself and the ANC but also considered these issues the underbelly of the ruling party.

Foregrounding its moralist orientation Cope's manifesto claimed to offer an honest, clean leadership with integrity, based on constitutional values, with a particular emphasis on an independent judiciary. In making this claim Cope sought to capitalise on the moral revulsion felt by some at the thought of a possible Jacob Zuma presidency. Zuma, who had earlier been cleared of a charge of the rape of an HIV-positive woman, had been elected ANC president in December 2007 while still facing charges of corruption (Gordin 2008). Cope pointed to Zuma as the embodiment of moral depravity.

Professor Barney Pityana, an ordained priest and then vice-chancellor and principal of the University of South Africa (Unisa),² in his speech to the national convention, was even more direct, charging Zuma with lacking 'moral consciousness', thereby placing the moral fibre of the South African society and the efficiency of the government in peril. The much revered Archbishop Emeritus of the Anglican Church, Mpilo Desmond Tutu, reiterated the embarrassment felt by his ilk at the thought of having Zuma as the presidential face of the country in the international community: 'In the year of Obama, can you imagine what it is like when you are walking in New York and they ask you who will be the next president ... at the present time, I can't pretend to be looking forward to having him as president' (www.mg.co.za 2 April 2009).

2 Pityana was to become chairperson of Cope's selection committee, which was responsible for compiling the party's list of parliamentary candidates.

The appointment of a clergyman, Bishop Mvume Dandala, former head of the Methodist Church in Southern Africa, as Cope's presidential candidate underscored the party's moralist orientation. Indeed, the bishop drew attention to this point on accepting his nomination:

Our vision for the future is of a government founded on the values of honesty, integrity and justice. That happens to be my personal philosophy and also our collective vision as Cope...I joined Cope because I have spent my life working for peace, fighting for justice and seeking a society where integrity is the most important guiding philosophy. I found in Cope people who share these values

blogs.timeslive.co.za

But Dandala was more than just a member of the clergy. He came from the tradition of black theology, having been chairperson of the South African Students' Organisation (Saso) while a student at the Federal Theological Seminary in Alice in the Eastern Cape (<http://en.wikipedia.org>). Black theology combined proselytising with demands for both justice and involvement in community struggles in pursuance of those demands. Addressing a conference of black priests in Edendale, Natal, in 1972, Steve Bantu Biko defined black theology as:

... a situational interpretation of Christianity. It seeks to relate present-day black man to God within the given context of black man's suffering and his attempts to get out of it ... it shifts the emphasis from petty sins to major sins in a society, thereby ceasing to teach the people to 'suffer peacefully'.

Biko 1978, p 54

Biko reminded the black clergy that: '... God is not in the habit of coming down from heaven to solve people's problem on earth'. So their role, he said, was not just to 'stand on pulpits every Sunday to heap loads of blame on black people in townships for their thieving, housebreaking, stabbing ...' Rather, it was to become actively involved in the struggle for national liberation (Biko 1978, p 54).

Dandala was the kind of activist-priest Biko envisaged. His fiery sermons in Port Elizabeth in the heyday of apartheid were often tinged with a political message and were, at times, delivered during congregational walkabouts (*imvuselelo*) on the dusty streets of Port Elizabeth's townships, in defiance of the prohibitions imposed by the state of emergency. This made Dandala, alongside peers such as Andile Mbethe, Mcebisi Xundu, and De Villiers Soga, targets

of frequent harassment and detention by the apartheid police.³ From being a household name in Port Elizabeth Dandala rose to national prominence by brokering peace between hostel and township dwellers of the then Katorus during the violence of the early 1990s in the then Witwatersrand region.

In selecting a person with Dandala's history Cope not only illuminated its moralist orientation it also underscored its message of continuity and change. Dandala was part of the anti-apartheid movement, but also offered the moral leadership that Cope alleged was lacking in the ANC. A similar mix of qualities, albeit with a slight twist, had been achieved in the composition of Cope's leadership, appointed at the party's founding conference. The national leadership comprised prominent political activists and veterans of the liberation struggle, members of notable political families, and novices.⁴

The message was that although the party originated from the liberation tradition it would transcend the politics of its mother-body, offering an alternative to the ruling party. Part of Lekota's trans-racial appeal was his critical stance on affirmative action, further discussed below. He denounced the policy as racist and as an obstacle to building a non-racial society. Affirming blacks over whites, Lekota said, denied South Africa much-needed expertise that lay in the hands of white folk and the general citizenry.

An emphasis on meritocracy completed the two-pronged election strategy. The party homed in on the slow rate and poor quality of service delivery, attributing this phenomenon to incompetence and a scarcity of technical skills within the public service.

The problems, Cope maintained, lay in the ANC's policy of cadre deployment – a practice that involved the appointment of party members to official positions, for which some lacked the requisite professional and/or technical competence. By contrast, Cope punted merit rather than political appointments. Consequently, and inevitably, as noted below, Cope underplayed the importance of race as one of the employment criteria to rectify under-representation of blacks within the country's professional life.

Essentially, Cope adopted an electoral posture intended to appeal to constituencies that found morally abhorrent both the personality, that is, Zuma,

3 Here the author draws on his personal knowledge and experience as a native of Port Elizabeth and a former congregant of the Ebenezer Methodist Church in Zwide Township.

4 Prominent political activists and veterans were: Lekota, president; Mbhazima Shilowa, first deputy president; Smuts Ngonyama, head of policy; Mluleki George, national organiser; Mlungisi Hlongwane, head of elections; Charlotte Lobe, secretary-general; Hilda Ndunde, treasurer; Phillip Dexter, head of media liaison and Lyndall Shope-Mafole, head of international relations. The novices were: Lynda Odendaal, second deputy president; Deidre Carter, deputy secretary-general; Zahira Ebrahim, head of sectors. See Cope (2008), *Organisational Report*, distributed at the founding conference.

and the life lived in poorly developed communities. These were two distinct, but not entirely exclusive constituencies. They included the traditional black ANC constituency, but also apathetic yet eligible voters. 'A third of eligible voters,' explained Pityana (17 September 2009), 'do not vote. And this is the constituency that Lekota sought to appeal to.' In other words, the party was to be a trans-racial organisation appealing especially to the middle class, who also suffered from a touch of cultural prejudice against Zuma. Zuma offends middle-class sensibilities. He is polygamous, lacks formal education and his public appearances are defined by singing and dancing – a far cry from the intellectual rigour and sophistication that has always characterised the leadership of the liberation movement.

Cope thus emerged on South Africa's political landscape both as an heir of liberation politics and transcending such politics. Its platform potentially appealed to myriad constituencies: the working-class and poor black community, the middle class across racial lines, and the younger generation, who were looking for trans-racial politics and had no memory of or sentimental attachment to liberatory politics or its heroic figures.

BUILD-UP TO THE ELECTIONS

As 22 April 2009 drew closer it became increasingly clear that materialism rather than value-based considerations would largely determine how people would vote. Cope's targeted constituencies, though possibly sharing a similar value system, were irreconcilable; separated by racial inequalities. Business was similarly not persuaded by Cope's moralist orientation, choosing profit-making instead. Conviction alone proved insufficient to sustain defections in the face of uncertainty about livelihood.

Cope's instant popularity within cyber space confirmed its attraction to the middle class, which has both access to and the expertise to use that medium of communication. By 10 December 2008, according to Charlotte Lobe, who was to become Cope's secretary-general, the party had 9 000 members registered on its Facebook page. They were even conferred the status of a branch and were given a 50-person delegation to the party's founding conference (www.iol.co.za 12 October 2008).

Instead of using rallies, the traditional form of mobilisation and recruitment, Cope organised parties to attract young members. Andile Nkuhlu, then Cope convener in the Eastern Cape and relatively wealthy, was responsible for such activities, especially in Port Elizabeth. Nkuhlu was already renowned for hosting parties, a reputation he had built as a student at the University of the Western Cape. No slogans were shouted or speeches made at Cope parties. Now and then the disk jockey would shout out names of Cope leaders and the crowd would cheer

back in approval. Occasionally someone would start a song. The popular song, at least in the city of Port Elizabeth, was: *Buya Thabo Mbeki, buya!* (Come back, Thabo Mbeki, come back!). The party's T-shirts, especially for girls, were small and tight, showing off navels and body form. The overall idea was to present Cope as 'sexy and cool'. In the midst of all that partying, literature was distributed and more members were signed up. The idea was to use fun, the one thing that appeals to the youth, especially over the festive season, to draw potential supporters to the party's leaders and views.⁵

Cope seemed poised to reconfigure South African politics, but its founding principles and the credibility of its leaders were soon tested. Though Dandala's appointment as presidential candidate conveyed a moralist orientation that contrasted it with the ANC, the bishop was not a unanimous choice. Lekota was not enthusiastic about Dandala's selection and Shilowa's supporters, who had swung in favour of Dandala's candidature, according to Pityana, seem more than happy to rub Lekota's nose in the defeat. This was apparent in the way in which the news of Dandala's selection was handled. In a blatant violation of confidentiality, Pityana explained, the news reached the media less than an hour after the end of the meeting of the party's national executive, the Congress National Committee (CNC). The selection committee had secured an undertaking from members of the CNC that they would not leak the news or inform any of the contending candidates – Shilowa, Dandala and Lekota, who had been excluded from the briefing – until it had itself conveyed the decision to each of them (Interview 17 September 2009).

The leak seemed calculated to upset Lekota. According to Pityana, during the deliberations Shilowa's supporters, as noted above, had swung in favour of Dandala and before Pityana had had time to phone Shilowa to inform him of the decision Shilowa had called Pityana to congratulate him on it. Lekota did not call Pityana and refused to take calls from him or any other member of the committee during the weekend of 20 February 2009. While Shilowa publicly endorsed Dandala's selection, Lekota, when the media finally located him on 22 February, claimed ignorance of the decision, saying he was awaiting a formal briefing by the CNC the following day. Lekota's reluctance to endorse what was effectively an official decision, though not formally conveyed to him, suggested that he disapproved of the choice and gave an indication of what was to follow.

The dominant view within the CNC, however, was that Lekota was best suited to build the organisational structures of the then incipient party, outside of Parliament. But it soon emerged that Lekota either did not share that view or that the national leadership had not made a final decision. Cope issued conflicting statements and, by early May 2009, Lekota's name was still on the list of candidates

5 The author observed Cope activities while on vacation in Port Elizabeth in December 2008.

for the National Assembly, even though he had supposedly agreed to remain outside (*Mail&Guardianonline*). That was yet another sign of a schism at the helm of the party. Lekota's presence in Parliament would clearly have created tensions between himself and Dandala. As president of the party, it is unimaginable that Lekota would have settled for playing second fiddle to Dandala.

The party's credibility could not have remained unaffected by the leadership squabbles. Cope had claimed moral superiority over the ruling party, professing commitment to the broader goal of promoting democracy and constitutionalism. Now it was mired in petty leadership disputes, a spectacle that could hardly have impressed its potential voters. Nor did it seem that the middle class would be easy pickings for the party. Cope's stance on affirmative action seemed to appeal to white professionals, but did not go down well with their black counterparts.

Cope was particularly encouraged by one, Piet Grobler, 'a retired farmer from Thabazimbi in Limpopo', who attended the party's founding conference. He had been on holiday in Bloemfontein and, on hearing Lekota's views on affirmative action, not only decided to attend the three-day gathering but insisted on joining the party on the spot. He was paraded on stage to the cheers of approving audience, chanting: 'Long Live Grobler' (www.mg.co.za 15 December 2008).

There was no such enthusiasm from black professionals, at least not from their organised bodies. The Black Lawyers Association (BLA) and the Black Management Forum (BMF) were especially scathing about Cope. BLA president Andiswa Ndoni fumed: 'Cope seems determined to reverse the few gains made by black people on account of these policies in order to attract white votes. This is short sighted and out of step with the aspirations of black people and the equality provisions in the Constitution' (www.bla.org.za 18 December 2008). Jimmy Manyi, president of the BMF and chairperson of the Commission for Equity, in his usually direct language, charged:

Implicit in this resolution is a racist undertone that seeks to associate equity with inefficiencies. The BMF would argue very strongly that this resolution stigmatizes Affirmative Action, implying that candidates for AA lack merit. Racism and colonized mentality will always second guess Black professionals.

www.tradeinvestsa.co.za 16 February 2009

Black professional bodies tagged Cope as 'anti-black'. To them the party was essentially, to borrow from the president of the Congress of SA Trade Unions, Sdumo Dlamini, the 'new black DA [Democratic Alliance]' (www.iol.co.za 16 December 2008). Implicit in that criticism was that Cope was doing the bidding of white interests.

If, indeed, the sensibilities of the black middle class were offended by the mere thought of a Zuma presidency, with all that he represented, Cope's lacklustre posture on affirmative action must have put them in a dilemma. They were being asked to choose between registering their moral revulsion by voting for Cope, or advancing their class interests by voting for the ruling party, even though they were possibly repulsed by its leader.

Such was the mixed reaction elicited by Cope's stance on affirmative action. The fact that Piet Grobler joined the party may have offered encouragement that Cope indeed resonated with the white electorate. How widespread that resonance would be was unclear. As for the black middle class, their support for Cope was thrown into doubt by the reaction of the black professional bodies.

Misgivings notwithstanding, Cope was still determined to project an aura of inevitability about its ascension to political power. It actively wooed ANC leaders to defect to the party and the media were consistently fed with reports of eminent people who were going to defect to Cope. Some never did, among them Reverend Frank Chikane, former director-general in Mbeki's presidency, and Thoko Didiza and Sidney Mufamadi, former Cabinet ministers. Whether real or fabricated, the mere mention of possible defections was intended to project a ruling party in disarray and Cope as the party of the future. The rumours reinforced the message that Cope was the re-constitution of the 'true ANC cadres' because the post-2007 ANC had been usurped by non-ANC elements (imposters). Being led by familiar faces also gave Cope instant recognition, promising to make it easier for it to attract supporters.

Defections were thus pivotal to Cope's formation and popular resonance because of the message they sent out to the voting public. Their persistence, especially because they attracted wide media coverage, gave Cope an advantage over the ANC. Gwede Mantashe, the ANC's secretary-general, even reportedly complained to the public broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), that Cope did not deserve such prominent coverage. Mantashe dismissed the idea that Cope was a worthy story, insisting that media coverage be determined by proven public support. According to Mantashe, since Cope's popularity had not been tested it did not qualify for coverage.

Mantashe's logic was specious – media attention is largely attracted by newsworthiness of a (political) subject, not by the popular vote. Prominent media coverage clearly hurt the ANC, while benefiting Cope and the SABC gave in to pressure, opting not to give live coverage to the launch of Cope's election manifesto on 24 January 2009 but, as the SABC's Xolani Xundu conveyed to Cope's Siphso Mgwema, only to do a five-minute television crossover. Only 'political parties represented in parliament ... parties that have at least 1% of the votes' would be covered live (*Mail&Guardianonline* 23 January 2009).

Defections to Cope effectively disorganised the ANC, sowing mistrust among comrades and inhibiting the coherence of and focus on the party's election strategy. The ANC spent the latter part of 2008 'smelling out' out possible defectors. The list selection process, which had been scheduled to start in about September 2008, only took place in January 2009. The idea seems to have been to halt the process until the last possible moment, hoping that by then all the potential defectors would have defected, saving the party the embarrassment or the appearance of being rejected if it included someone on its list only for that person to decline the nomination in favour of the party's rival.

The ploy was, however, not entirely successful. Dennis Bloem, a prominent ANC MP, created some bewilderment in late February 2009 when his name appeared on both the ANC's and Cope's lists. By 5 March Bloem was still denying that he had joined Cope: 'I have no membership of any other party' (*Mail&Guardianonline*). When asked to explain why his name had been included in the Cope list, Bloem could only ascribe it to some confusion: 'I am busy sorting out this whole thing. I will clarify things when I have sorted out things.' A day later, on 6 March, Bloem confessed to having joined Cope.

The ruling party was left fuming. Jessie Duarte, ANC spokesperson at the time, went on the charge: 'For people who speak so much about morals, it is quite immoral. It is politically immoral' (*Mail&Guardianonline* 5 March). Clearly, the ANC leaders were not entirely in control. With just more than a month left before the election they still could not tell who would defect – a situation that could only breed uncertainty and lack of cohesion.

Reliance on defections, however, also proved risky for Cope, whose leaders were also not entirely in control of defections. Where individuals had made promises they had to trust that they would follow them through. But the ruling party could pre-empt or even reverse defections. Some individuals who had been touted as imminent defectors, as noted above, never left the ANC. Others, including the former president of the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) and mayor of Sedibeng, Mlungisi Hlongwane, and former regional secretary of the ANC in the Mandela Metro, Mike Xhego, returned to the ANC shortly before the elections. The ruling party sought maximum publicity, but, in the case of Hlongwane, this did not quite pan out. The regional, but influential Gauteng-based radio station, Talk Radio 702, through which the ruling party had aimed to make a live announcement, withdrew at the last minute, claiming to have been duped by a statement by Jeff Radebe, a senior ANC member and current Minister of Justice, who had billed the announcement 'as one of national importance'. Talk Radio 702 did not agree.

The event turned out somewhat comical. Hlongwane, accompanied by ANC officials, including Radebe himself, were ushered out of the radio station's

building. The announcement, which they had intended to be carried live on the airways, eliciting maximum publicity, was eventually made in a parking lot. Hlongwane, who had been appointed Cope's head of elections, launched a blistering attack on Cope, alleging tribalism:

A group of Xhosa speaking leaders have embarked on a secret strategy to place only the Xhosa speaking leaders at the strategic political structures in Cope ... it does mean that every person in Cope is a tribalist. It is regrettable that there are Xhosa speaking Cope leaders who have taken a conscious decision that Cope must be a predominantly Xhosa-led organization.

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Xhego's return to the ANC was also a public spectacle, but without any of the theatrics. A journalist writing for a local newspaper noted that a 'visibly embarrassed Xhego ... was paraded in front of a crowd like a naughty schoolboy' and 'was forced to fill in an ANC membership form and take an oath to "not again betray the ANC"'. Stone Sizane, ANC provincial chairperson, explained the intention behind the spectacle: 'This is to warn that there is no place more beautiful than home. We say to those out there [in Cope] if you miss coming back before April 21, it will be cold and lonely out there' (*The Herald* 16 April 2009). Xhego ascribed his return to the ANC to 'personal reasons' and declined to divulge anything beyond that.

Unrealised defections and defectors returning to the ANC probably undercut the intended impact of the defections. The dominant storyline of a haemorrhaging ANC and an ascendant Cope was no longer as lucid. The defections back to the ANC were, in fact, writing a new storyline: 'Cope was not what it had been built up to be.' Indeed, new developments within and about the party gave credence to that emerging impression.

Dandala and Lekota were reportedly at loggerheads over whose name and image should appear on both the party's election posters and the ballot paper⁶ and the party was virtually invisible in the early days of the election campaign. Cope had officially launched its campaign on 24 January 2009 at the Wilson stadium in Port Elizabeth, yet its election posters were hardly visible. In the meantime, the visibility of its chief rival, the ANC, was such that it seemed that every lamppost in the country had an ANC poster. Earlier, at the launch of its campaign, on 8 January, ANC supporters had filled two stadiums in East London, which was

6 The party eventually settled on Dandala's face on the posters and Lekota's on the ballot paper.

supposedly Cope's stronghold.⁷ Cope only managed to put its posters up on 13 March, about five weeks before election day. Dandala ascribed the delay to lack of sufficient funds: 'We would have loved to put up posters earlier, but Cope is experiencing what South African people are experiencing – a shortage of resources. We understand the problem of poverty. We are not flush with resources. We are the party of the people (*Mail & Guardianonline* 13 March 2009).

In short, Cope had designed its electoral message and leadership composition to appeal to communities of diverse material interests and income status, reaching beyond the black electorate. As election day drew closer, however, Cope's message, that is, that it was the 'party of hope', to rescue South Africa from the morass that would follow a Zuma presidency, began to lose its allure, as the party was itself mired in all manner of internal wrangling. The organised black middle class denounced the party as anti-transformation and a lackey of white interests. Lack of money cast doubts on the notion that Cope was the 'new show in town'. The fact that the party could not generate sufficient funds for posters suggested that the moneyed class were not convinced that Cope was a worthy investment. But only the electoral outcome would confirm the effectiveness of the party's orientation and electoral posture.

ELECTORAL RETURNS

Cope won the third-highest number of votes of the 26 parties which participated in the election, behind the two established parties, the incumbent ANC and the leading opposition party, the DA. Less than six months old, Cope outperformed some of the older and more experienced post-apartheid parties, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), the Independent Democrats (ID), the United Democratic Movement (UDM) and the Vryheidsfront Plus (VF+).

Cope won 1 256 133 of the total 17 389 246 votes cast, winning the largest share of its support in the Northern Cape, followed by the Eastern Cape, the Free State, North West, Gauteng, the Western Cape and Limpopo. It fared dismally in KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga. As a result, the party became the third-largest in Parliament and the official opposition in five of the nine provinces – Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Limpopo, Free State and North West.

⁷ Mluleki George, Cope's national organiser, had been regional chairperson of the ANC's Amathole region, where the city of East London is located.

Table 1
2009 elections – provincial and national results of the best performing parties by percentage

| Party | EC | FS | Gauteng | KZN | LP | MP | NW | NC | WP | Total |
|-------|-------|-------|---------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| ACDP | 0.53 | 0.73 | 0.87 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 0.51 | 0.69 | 0.99 | 1.47 | 0.79 |
| ANC | 68.72 | 71.10 | 64.04 | 62.95 | 84.88 | 85.55 | 72.89 | 60.75 | 31.55 | 65.06 |
| Azapo | 0.20 | 0.00 | 0.21 | 0.00 | 0.38 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.60 | 0.07 | 0.17 |
| Cope | 13.67 | 11.61 | 7.78 | 1.29 | 7.53 | 2.91 | 8.33 | 16.67 | 7.74 | 7.32 |
| DA | 9.99 | 11.60 | 21.86 | 9.15 | 3.48 | 7.49 | 8.25 | 12.57 | 51.46 | 16.74 |
| ID | 0.46 | 0.16 | 0.61 | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.12 | 0.44 | 4.94 | 4.68 | 0.96 |
| IFP | 0.10 | 0.22 | 1.49 | 20.40 | 0.06 | 0.50 | 0.15 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 4.99 |
| PAC | 0.52 | 0.29 | 0.29 | 0.05 | 0.48 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 0.27 |
| UCDP | 0.08 | 0.33 | 0.24 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 5.27 | 1.21 | 0.08 | 0.48 |
| UDM | 4.13 | 0.36 | 0.40 | 0.23 | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.51 | 0.15 | 0.71 | 0.87 |
| VF+ | 0.20 | 2.01 | 1.63 | 0.17 | 0.61 | 0.89 | 1.81 | 1.24 | 0.43 | 0.89 |

Source: Independent Electoral Commission of South Africa, www.elections.org.za

ELECTORAL ANALYSIS

The geographic spread of Cope's electoral support reveals a contrasting picture that both vindicates and disproves the party's electoral strategies and orientation. The obvious observation is that Cope has a national base. It won more than 10 per cent of the vote in three provinces – Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and the Free State – and fell just short of that threshold in the Western Cape and North West. The party has a trans-racial and trans-ethnic/linguistic appeal, especially among Africans and coloureds. The Northern Cape is predominantly coloured, while the Eastern Cape is predominantly African. SeSotho is the dominant language in the Free State, whilst IsiXhosa and Afrikaans are most commonly spoken in the Eastern Cape and the Northern Cape respectively. The party's appeal also cut across income status and possibly appeals more to low-income earners and the unemployed.

The distribution of Cope's electoral support showed a party with the strong potential for expansion. Its apparent appeal to low-income earners and the unemployed, especially, augured well for the party, for that segment of the population constitutes the majority. What is most crucial to note, however, is that though Cope seemed relatively popular amongst low-income and indigent communities, that status was not necessarily a determining factor in their voting

for Cope. In its stronghold of the Northern Cape, where the party won the highest number of votes, municipalities of relatively similar socio-economic profile voted discernibly differently. In other words, the socio-economic communities in which Cope achieved both its greatest and its smallest successes were essentially indistinguishable in terms of their socio-economic configuration.

The Northern Cape municipalities of Thembelihle and Phokwane offer an instructive contrast. Cope won its highest support in Thembelihle (28.10%) and its lowest in Phokwane (9.51%), yet the two municipalities have almost indistinguishable profiles. Twenty-two percent of residents in Thembelihle have no education at all, only 38 per cent have primary education, 7 per cent reached secondary school level but did not matriculate, 6 per cent have a matric and only 3 per cent have tertiary qualifications.

Of the 4 331 households, 1 649 are indigents (Statistics SA 2007). Similarly, Phokwane 'represents 20.3 per cent of the poverty gap in Northern Cape', making it the area with one of the highest poverty gaps in the province, according to the Local Development Economic Plan (2004, p 28). Eighty-four per cent of the economically active earn less than R3 200 and a whopping 32 per cent of the population has no schooling at all, while less than 21 per cent have matriculated.

The picture is similar in the Eastern Cape, where Cope received the second-highest proportion of support. Mbashe municipality, where Cope won the highest support (21,11%), is no different from Bavianaans, where the party's support was at its lowest (4.87%). Mbashe is the poorest municipality in the Amathole District, with poverty levels ranging from 76 per cent to 78 per cent. More than two-thirds of its households depend on social grants, higher than the district average (Urban-Econ 2009). The same profile is found in the two municipalities, with 42 per cent of the population of Bavianaans living in poverty and one-third of its economically active population unemployed (Integrated Development Plan 2007-2012).

The fact that Cope appealed to poor and indigent communities was inconsistent with its own orientation. The party had not necessarily fashioned itself as an agent of working-class interests. On the contrary, it propagated policies that placed it to the right of centre on the ideological spectrum. The party decried what it considered high wages and regulations that restricted the ability of employers to hire and fire at will. Working-class votes for Cope, therefore, did not stem from ideological conviction. What, then, explains the party's relative popularity within working-class and poor communities?

The answer is to be found in the leadership schism within the ruling party. The party performed best in provinces like the Northern Cape (15.94%), the Eastern Cape (13.31%), the Free State (11.11%) and the Western Cape (9.06%), where the ANC was beset by schisms and, as a result, suffered significant

defections. The Northern Cape and Western Cape had experienced particularly severe disruptions, including violent attacks on provincial leaders. The then premier of the Western Cape, Ebrahim Rasool, and provincial secretary Mcebisi Skwatsha, for instance, were entangled in a bitter power struggle, with the one supporting Mbeki and the other Zuma as the party's national president in the lead-up to the 2007 Polokwane conference. Skwatsha was gruesomely stabbed by an alleged member of the opposing faction at a meeting of the ANC's Boland region in Worcester in June 2008 following the suspension of the region's executive council by Skwatsha's provincial executive.

Provincial and regional conferences in the Northern Cape, held in 2008, were routinely disrupted and marked by violent skirmishes between supporters of Neville Mompoti and John Bloch, who were contesting the position of chairperson in the province. In the Free State provincial leaders were squaring up in the courts. Vax Mayekiso challenged the legality of the proceedings of earlier regional conferences, alleging that they had been manipulated by Ace Magashule, chairperson of the ANC in the province. Mayekiso and Pat Matosa were effectively at odds with Magashule (*Dispatch online* 1 December 2008; www.politicsweb.co.za 25 November 2008; www.sabcnews.org.za 17 January 2009).

The provincial schisms within the ANC bred defections of senior and credible leaders. Senior provincial leaders who left the ANC to lead Cope included the Northern Cape's Neville Mompoti, Fezile Kies and Fred Wyngaard; Siphatho Handi, Sam Kwelita, Andile Nkuhlu and Nosimo Balindlela in the Eastern Cape; the Free State's Vax Mayekiso, Papi Kganare, Chartotte Lobe, Casca Mokitlane, Gertrude Mothupi, Mzwandile Hleko and Mahlomula Ralebese; the Western Cape's Leonard Ramatlakane (www.sabcnews.org.za 17 January 2009). Conversely, in provinces such as KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, where the ANC provincial leadership was relatively stable, Cope performed poorly. In KwaZulu-Natal and Mpumalanga, especially, where no provincial leaders defected, Cope received, as noted above, the lowest support (1.29% and 2.91% respectively).

Cope benefited from the local prominence of its provincial leaders, who took some of their supporters with them to the new party. The ANC was also possibly dented by constant reports of instability within the provincial leadership in those provinces. Unseemly scenes and accounts of violence possibly disillusioned some ANC supporters, driving them to Cope. Reliance on ANC defectors paid off in that respect.

The middle-class posture, however, does not appear to have yielded the intended results. Perhaps Cope did, indeed, attract middle-class voters but in the absence of an exit poll it is impossible to determine their numbers with absolute precision. The concentration of its support among working-class and poor

communities, however, strongly suggests that the party attracted more support from the latter than from middle- and upper-class voters. That was not entirely unexpected. Visceral criticism from the organised bodies of the black middle class, arising from the party's stance on affirmative action, did not portend an enthusiastic reception from this section of the black community. The black middle class is the primary beneficiary of affirmative action. Its growth and prominence, especially in the public sector in the past ten years or so, is owed primarily to this policy.

The need for affirmative action still remains, however. A report by the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) for the year 2007/8 showed grossly skewed racial and gender representation at management level. Whites, the report stated, constituted more than 68.2 per cent of employees at top management level, compared to 28.8 per cent of blacks (with the rest taken up by foreign nationals, as is the case with the categories cited below). White males are dominant (more than 58%) and white females far outnumber their black counterparts, occupying 9.8 per cent of top management positions, compared to 8 per cent of black females – African, Indian and coloured. Under-representation is even more acute vis-à-vis Africans, who make up just about 18 per cent.

There is a similar pattern of under representation at senior and middle management levels. Whites make up more than 62 per cent of senior management compared to blacks (32.4%) and within middle management whites occupy 57.7 per cent of positions, with blacks constituting 41.3 per cent. Similarly, white women outnumber their black counterparts by 15.2 per cent to 9.7 per cent at senior management level and by 18.5 per cent to 14.9 per cent at middle management level. Under representation of blacks, the report concluded, was the result of 'unfair discrimination practices' that still persisted in workplaces, which are predominantly managed by whites.

Cope's ambivalence about affirmative action struck a bitter note within the black middle class, resulting in the party easily being caricatured as a proxy of white interests at the expense of black mobility. Jimmy Manyi spent much of December 2008 on the airwaves reiterating precisely that message and running what effectively amounted to a campaign against Cope.⁸ It is not unimaginable, therefore, that a considerable number of black middle-class voters were turned off Cope by its stance on affirmative action.

Material interests had a similar determining effect on the disposition of business towards Cope. The lack of funds Dandala admitted to was reflected in the party's campaign. Cope only put up posters within five weeks of the 22 April

⁸ Manyi was appointed director-general in the Department of Labour when the new ANC government took office after the elections.

election day, long after it had launched its election manifesto, thus failing to capitalise on the momentum generated by the launch of the manifesto. The result was a lack of visibility during what was a crucial campaign period.

Business could hardly have been inaccessible to Cope, which boasted several business luminaries in its midst. Among them were Saki Macozoma and Mzi Khumalo. Cope member Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka had been Thabo Mbeki's deputy president, a position that certainly exposed her to business associations and influential people. Similarly, as premier of Gauteng, the economic hub of South Africa, Mbhazima Shilowa, Cope's second deputy president, had close dealings with the business sector, a relationship probably strengthened by the fact that his wife, Wendy Luhabe, is one of South Africa's most successful business women.

If Cope did not suffer from want of access to the business sector, or at least a section of it, what then explains its lacklustre fund-raising campaign? Shilowa (15 September 2009) ascribed it to the party's stance on disclosing the identities of donors. This had been a topical issue in public discussions, especially following the revelations in a much publicised book, *After the Party*, by former ANC MP Andrew Feinstein, that the ruling party had received substantial bribes from arms manufacturing companies in return for contracts. Media reports that the ANC had received a cash injection from the Chinese, partly prompted by its impressive campaign, served to re-open the debate about disclosure of donor sources. Anonymous donations sparked concerns that government would prioritise business interests over the citizenry, thus prodding Cope to commit to disclosure.

Disclosure must have sat uncomfortably with business people, especially those doing business with the state, fearing reprisals from the ruling party. These fears were not unjustified. The ANC responded harshly to prominent individuals who sided with the opposition. In addition, at some level, business was probably not keen to oust the ruling party. Successive ANC governments have been good for business 'not so much through any direct assistance to business, though corporate taxation remains constrained, but rather through its evident acceptance of what businessmen perceive to be economic sense' (Lodge 1999, p 9).

Macroeconomic policy and, indeed, government conduct has generally been favourable to private capital, both domestic and international. In 1996 Nelson Mandela's government, in introducing the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (Gear) policy, effectively consented to the dominant logic within the private sector that the state should adopt a less interventionist role in the economy and allow the market to regulate itself. The market, it was reasoned, would engender growth, from which development would flow. This effectively meant that the state, as had been stated in the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) policy blueprint adopted by the ANC and its Cosatu and

South African Communist Party allies, would not pursue a redistributive agenda. Private sector's contribution to revenue, for instance, dropped from 18 per cent in 1990 to 11 per cent in 1999, while personal tax increased from 30 per cent to 42 per cent in the same period (Terreblanche 2002).

Business lacked a compelling reason to seek a weakened ANC. Nor has it ever been moved by lofty ideals of promoting competitive democracy. South African business thrived at the height of apartheid brutality. Only the fear that the radicalisation of black politics in the early 1980s would breed popular resentment against capitalism prompted business to support political change. It tolerated the political regime as long as it aided or did not interfere with profit making (O'Meara 1996).

Albeit less of a factor within established business, fear of reprisals must have nonetheless have been real amongst the black elite, especially within institutions susceptible to political influence. The ruling party dealt harshly with those who were either supportive of or active in Cope activities. Incidents related to Barney Pityana, in his role as vice-chancellor of Unisa, and to his university provide an instructive example. ANC-allied trade union and a student body at the university targeted Pityana for removal, alleging incompetence and political bias.

The campaign commenced shortly after Pityana's public rebuke of Jacob Zuma, then contesting the position of president of the ANC, for lacking a 'moral conscience'. Pityana disapproved of Zuma's candidature because he considered Zuma 'a liability' and, in the light of his personal history, believed it was 'not possible for Zuma to fight corruption' (Interview 17 September 2009). The allegation of incompetence was never substantiated and it was clear that the campaign was politically driven. Removal was to be Pityana's punishment for having expressed disapproval of a Zuma presidency and for his subsequent role as chairperson of Cope's selection committee. The instruction to remove him, Pityana asserts, 'came from ANC headquarters at Luthuli House'.

Such reprisals did not necessarily deter others from voting for Cope, the secret ballot protects voters from any such reprisals, but the very existence of threats and actual reprisals reveals the ruling party's conception of the state and its expectations of individuals associated with the liberation movement. Though he is an accomplished academic and professional in his own right, the ruling party seems to have expected Professor Pityana to adopt a less strident posture with respect to the government and the ANC.

Although he had never held office in the ANC Pityana came from a background of liberation politics, having been introduced to politics by Themba Mqota (aka Alfred Kgokong), a stalwart of the movement. He went on to become one of the leading figures in the Black Consciousness Movement and a close confidant of Steve Biko. He kept in close contact with the ANC while he

was in England. The post-1994 government looked favourably upon Pityana. Nelson Mandela's government appointed him chairperson of the newly formed Human Rights Commission of South Africa, a statutory body mandated by the Constitution to enforce and promote adherence to human rights. Upon completing two terms at the commission Pityana was appointed the first African vice-chancellor and principal of Unisa, an appointment that was celebrated as a great milestone towards transformation within the academy.

The ruling party's attempts to oust Pityana suggested a sense of betrayal on their part. Pityana, it would seem, should not have vocalised his thoughts publicly. In doing so, according to the ANC, he became unworthy to retain the leadership of a prominent public institution. Suddenly it mattered less that he merited the position, appointment to such positions was not decided solely on merit, but on political affiliation, the latter being more important than the former. The ANC seems to believe that state institutions should be led by individuals who agree with its views. The requirements of the position alone are insufficient to determine the calibre of the appointee. The ruling party thus seeks to deny public institutions independence and to subject them to its own whims. The distinction between the party and the state is blurred.

CONCLUSION

Cope's electoral returns confirmed its *raison d'être*, while casting doubts on the usefulness of its election strategy. The party trumpeted constitutionalism, moral leadership and trans-racial politics. The profile of its electoral support, however, belies that strategy. It drew most of its votes from working-class black communities and had little appeal among the black middle class or among white voters, to whom the thrust of its electoral strategy was supposedly geared.

But, that did not necessarily make Cope the sole party of choice among the working-class poor. Communities with a similar socio-economic profile put their mark against its chief rival, the ANC. What determined which communities voted for Cope in relatively high numbers was the state of the ruling party within a given province. Where the ANC was beset by ructions and prominent defections Cope had a strong showing, while the contrary held where the ruling party was relatively coherent.

Defectors played a pivotal role in attracting support for the party, with voters attracted by the personal political biographies of Cope's leaders. But by and large the party's strategy was blunted by its inconsistency. Constitutionalism generally appealed to the middle class, but the party's wishy-washy stance on affirmative action probably turned them off. Under-representation of blacks, especially within the private sector, remains acute and it was always unlikely

that the black middle class would support a party that posed a potential threat to its material interests.

Lack of funds derailed the party's campaign, with the effect that the publicity afforded by the many defections to the party was undercut by a lack of visibility at a critical point in the election campaign. Cope's failure to attract substantial donations was partly a reflection on business's disposition towards competitive democracy. Business people avoided jeopardising good relations or even business transactions with the ruling party by funding the opposition and successive ANC governments had been good for business, nullifying any intention to oust the ruling party.

As for the future of the party, it looks bleak. Cope has essentially fallen onto its own sword. It promised morally upright leadership, only to be mired in ugly leadership rivalry that has played itself out in the open. The party experienced a leadership exodus soon after the elections. Lynda Odendaal, the second deputy president, was the first to resign, followed by Simon Grindrod, national organiser and, recently, the party's former presidential candidate and parliamentary leader, Bishop Mvume Dandala. All cited leadership factionalism and squabbles as the reason for their resignation. Personal interests overtook the promised idea of building a competitive democracy. Individuals seemed determined to secure leadership positions at any cost, either for egotistic reasons and/or to secure material benefits.

Political office has long been the dominant source of income for South Africa's black political elite, a situation that is typical of post-colonial developing states. Unlike developed liberal democracies, where the political elite is drawn from the propertied class, political elites in post-colonial states emanate from the impoverished masses. Though a few may be distinguished from the rest by their educational status they, too, lack a material base. Colonial oppression closed off any opportunities for accumulation or even for decent employment for blacks. They came into office without any savings and most did not have the technical or professional skills to secure employment elsewhere. Political office becomes the first and best form of formal employment for most (Markovitz 1977; Sandbrook 1985).

Income may not have been the primary consideration for the chief rivals, Lekota and Shilowa. Lekota has commercial interests, while Shilowa has a business mogul for a spouse. But to most, especially the provincial and regional level leadership, Cope was probably an instrument to safeguard income, especially when it seemed unlikely that they would secure spots on the ANC's lists for Parliament and the various legislatures. They quickly aligned themselves with one leader against another in return for prominent positions should that leader triumph in the presidential stakes. Public exchanges between two prominent Cope

figures, Lynda Odendaal⁹ and Siphon Mgwema¹⁰, told of secret meetings held by competing factions strategising about how to secure the Cope presidency for their favourite candidate (*Sowetan* 15 July 2009). The two candidates were not entirely blameless – they could have refused to become the subject of factionalist politics. But, it seems, the lure of the Cope presidency militated against any considerations of broader goals.¹¹

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9 Odendaal was subsequently unveiled as an ANC member at a much publicised event in Gauteng, accompanied by the ANC's provincial leaders, including its chairperson and deputy minister, Paul Mashatile.

10 Ngwema, who served as a spokesperson for Cope, is closely associated with Bulelani Ngcuka, one of the reported funders of Cope, who, as head of the National Prosecution Authority, initiated the prosecution of Jacob Zuma, alleging that he had received bribes from arms manufacturing companies.

11 Correspondence from Simon Grindrod to the secretary-general: 'Confidential Memorandum – CWC Members Only', 9 June 2009 and his subsequent resignation letter, 7 July 2009, shed further light on the internal squabbles that had beset the party.

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