SUMMARY REPORT ON THE CONDUCT OF BIOMETRIC VOTER REGISTRATION IN LIBERIA

EISA-International Election Observation Mission (EISA-IEOM)

Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA)

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1. Background

As part of its mandate of supporting electoral integrity and credibility in Liberia, the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) observed the Biometric Voter Registration (BVR) exercise on an independent and nonpartisan basis through its International Election Observation Mission (IEOM) to Liberia's 2023 Presidential and Legislative elections. To this effect, EISA released two observation reports, covering observations made during phase one and phase two of the BVR process. This report is a summation of the IEOMs findings on the conduct of BVR inclusive of data cleaning procedures (deduplication and exhibition) undertaken by the National Elections Commission (NEC) to produce and consolidate the Final Registration Roll (FRR) to be used for the Presidential and Legislative Elections scheduled for 10 October 2023.

This report is cognizant of the fact that a segmented approach was deployed to conduct BVR in all 15 counties of Liberia. Therefore, it is valuable for the EISA IEOM to effectively reflect on observations made during phase one and two of the BVR process to make an independent assessment of the voter registration process in its entirety. The report also covers the IEOM’s observations on the hearing of objections and appeals on voter registration and the exhibition of the Provisional Registration Roll (PRR).

EISA Long Term Observers (LTOs) arrived in Monrovia on 24 April 2023 and have observed the voter registration process extensively, covering 11 of Liberia’s 15 counties. In addition, EISA LTOs have conducted consultative interviews with key electoral stakeholders to clarify findings, note their perspectives and better understand the successes and challenges encountered in the implementation of BVR in Liberia. The implementation of BVR in Liberia is the first of its kind and a milestone in electoral democracy. Having observed the use of the paper based Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) forms and camera in the previous 2017 Presidential and Legislative elections, the EISA IEOM is encouraged by the resolve of the NEC to evolve its voter registration system and address shortcomings of the OMR system through the adoption of this technology.

In 2017, the EISA IEOM noted some challenges in the voter registration process and highlighted opportunities for improvement as contained in its 2017 IEOM report. The 2023 IEOM has therefore utilised lessons learnt in 2017 to guide its methodology for observing the conduct of BVR in Liberia. The IEOM also draws on the expertise of its Long-Term Observers through weekly field reports on direct and indirect observations through stakeholder consultations.

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2 EISA LTOs could not observe the BVR Phase 1 in Gbarpolu, River Gee, Grand Kru and Maryland as they were deployed after this phase. Phase 1 was observed by the core team.
2. Methodology

The EISA-IEOM to Liberia is independent and strives to perform its functions without favour in a neutral and objective manner. EISA utilizes the electoral cycle approach\(^3\) in observing elections. Recognising the importance of the BVR exercise in laying the foundation for the conduct of the elections, the IEOM directly observed BVR procedures at county levels and conducted stakeholder consultations to triangulate information. A pre-approved checklist was used to collect data that informed the mission’s assessment of the process. The IEOM relies on EISA’s online data management system Popola to collect, analyse and store information gathered from the field. The observation methodology for Phase 2 of the BVR was focused on both and indirect observation at randomly selected registration centers in six out of the nine counties, stakeholder consultations, and desk review. EISA’s assessment of the integrity of the BVR process was based on evaluating NEC’s procedures and adherence to the Liberian Constitution, Election Laws, and regional and international norms and standards.

3. Legal and Constitutional Framework

The Constitution of the Republic of Liberia sets the foundational framework for the conduct of elections. Key processes and activities undertaken by the NEC (BVR, Exhibition and Civic and Voter Education (CVE)) all find their roots in the election laws as amended by the Electoral Reform Laws of 2004, and the 2014 Act to amend certain provisions of the 1986 Elections Law, the Law on Political Parties, and NEC regulations and decisions constitute the legal framework for voter registration and the conduct of the 2023 presidential and legislative elections in Liberia.

Voter Registration in Liberia is periodic and is carried out by the NEC in accordance with section 3.1 (a) of the New Elections Law. Article 77 (b) of the 1986 Constitution of Liberia stipulates that any citizen of Liberia who is 18 years or older has the right to register as a voter and participate in public elections. However, individuals who have been judicially declared incompetent or of unsound mind, as stated in Section 3.1 of The New Elections Law 2014: Section 5.1 Voters Registration Regulations 2022, are exempted from this right.

The EISA IEOM notes that to guide the conduct of BVR, the NEC issued the following applicable regulations in October 2022:

- Voter Registration Regulations
- General Election Regulations
- Hearing Procedures Regulations

In addition to the above-mentioned domestic statutes, Liberia is a member of the international community and is therefore obliged to adhere to regional and international benchmarks and principles.

\(^3\)https://aceproject.org/ace-en/focus/focus-on-effective-electoral-assistance/the-electoral-cycle-approach/mobile_browsing/onePage
that it has ratified over the years. With regards to voter registration the following treaties are applicable:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
- The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance
- ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance

3.1. Gaps in the legal framework

In review of the legal framework, EISA has noted gaps between the Constitution and the New Elections Law that have contributed significantly to challenges faced by the NEC during the BVR exercise.

- A conflict between the concept of ordinary residence, as outlined in Section 5.2 of the Voters Registration Regulations 2022, and Article 80 (c) of the Liberian Constitution. The law does not provide sufficient ground for the NEC to clearly delimitate where citizens can register and to also provide redress in cases of voter trucking. The New Elections Law obliges voters to register where they "ordinarily reside," an amendment aimed at preventing "trucking," or bringing voters from outside of a district or the country to register and vote in an area where they do not ordinarily inhabit. However, neither the law texts nor the NEC's Trainer Manual for Voter Registration define ordinary residence or guide how registration officials ought to determine where a voter often lives. According to the legislation, the primary papers required to demonstrate eligibility are a passport, a birth certificate, or a certificate of naturalization. Other acceptable means of identification include the sworn testimony of two registered voters in person or confirmation by a traditional leader. None of these requirements speak to physically proven proof of ordinary residence.

- Although Section 10.1 (a) of the New Elections Law of 2014 recognizes voter trucking as an illegal act and empowers the NEC to take punitive measures, it is difficult to activate the law as the law does not specify what actions constitute the trucking of voters.

- The Elections Law does not adequately provide direction in dealing with minors that commit electoral offenses. During BVR, the NEC was inundated with cases of underage registrants, as minors falsely represented themselves to NEC officials as being 18 years and above. In this regard, section 10.2(a) which prohibits making false statements to Elections Officers during the registration process cannot be applicable in the case of minors as it contradicts Section 11.42 of the Judiciary Law which provides special treatment for minors who come into conflict with the law. This section states that a juvenile over the age of 16 cannot be placed in prison, jail, lockup, or police station unless there is no other safe and suitable detention place available or if it is necessary for their protection or the protection of the public.

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4 Punishable by a fine or imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or both
• The law is silent on the utilization of BVR to adequately account for the conduct of Biometric Voter Registration in Liberia, rather it remains general and refers only to the exercise of voter registration. Considering that BVR signals an introduction of technology in elections, it is good practice for the legal framework to reflect on the rationale for technology and to also ensure that the technology complies with the principle for democratic elections.

4. Trends emerging from BVR

The EISA IEOM notes that the BVR exercise was conducted in two phases over 42 days and afforded equal length of time and opportunity to citizens across the country. Phase one covering six counties was conducted from 20 March 2023 to 9 April 2023 whilst phase two covering nine counties was conducted from 21 April to 11 May 2023. The IEOM is satisfied that the NEC applied BVR procedures in a uniform manner across the phases and this enables the mission to draw some trends across the phases.

4.1. Operation of BVR Kits

More prevalent in all the phases was the failure to properly charge the BVR kits. The pattern was observed primarily on days 1 and 2 in each phase, and thereafter, most centers started operating normally. EISA LTOs noted that the interruption of the power supply of the BVR kits resulted in delayed registration and interrupted the printing of the voter registration cards. As the registration progressed, the NEC staff seemed to become more familiar with the operations of the kits and further disruptions were not observed.

4.2. Overnight Storage and Safety of BVR Kits

The NEC had no standard procedure for overnight BVR kit safekeeping. It was at the discretion of the BVR staff on how to safely store the kits for instance, in some areas, the kits were stored at the Town Chiefs house, at a police station, classroom or school offices and in other circumstances, the kits were stored at the residence of the BVR staffers. Considering the sensitivity of the kits and citizens' data in the kits, NEC must establish well-laid-down security and safety protocols for overnight storage to maintain integrity of the process. The Town Chiefs and Police Officers are not cleared by the law to handle such, and in the event of loss or any mishap, responsibility is difficult to place on them, and steps must be taken to ensure uniformity in handling the BVR Kits. Ensuring the security of the kits is also critical because the BVR kits contain personal information of registrants that needs to be protected at all times. Information privacy is an important global principle that assists in ensuring that information gathered is protected from manipulation and abuse. The IEOM also gathered that the BVR kits were not synchronized to any central data system and that the BVR kits had to be transported back to the NEC in Monrovia for data extraction. As there was no real-time backup of the information, it was even more critical to provide adequate safety measures.
4.3. Fluidity of residence requirement for registration
The EISA IEOM noted the fluidity of interpretation of the law as it relates to residence requirements at the point of registration. According to Section 5.2 of the Voters Registration Regulations 2022, individuals are required to register at a designated voter registration center in the area where they “ordinarily reside”. Hence there were various allegations of voter trucking, as places of ordinary residence can refer to places closest to where people conduct their business affairs or their places of origin. Procedural certainty is critical in elections to guarantee citizens’ and stakeholders' confidence and to buffer against potential disputes.

4.4. Prevalence of allegations of voter trucking
The EISA IOEM interacted with several stakeholders including political parties that confirmed widespread trucking of voters within districts, between districts and across neighboring countries. In this regard, political players were viewed as the main perpetrators of voter trucking. It was alleged that they used money to entice registrants in efforts to bolster their support base under the pretext of assisting voters with transport to BVR centers that were far from villages. EISA LTOs noted during their visits to BVR centers, people moving in large groups by foot towards or from centers. Yet it remained difficult to ascertain whether people had been trucked in or whether people preferred to travel in large numbers for safety, especially in remote areas. The risks of voter trucking were also raised as EISA LTOs in Nimba received reports that three people had died during the BVR process as they were being trucked in from district one to district 5 in Ganta by an unnamed political aspirant. The LNP confirmed that they had arrested the driver for drunk driving and that the case was escalated to the courts.

4.5. Dissatisfaction with the NEC in addressing voter trucking
The IEOM also noted a general dissatisfaction among stakeholders with the NECs approach in addressing voter trucking. The NEC was criticized for not clearly defining what constitutes trucking of voters and not being proactive in apprehending the practice. The statute is therefore found wanting because, in the two phases of BVR, many people continued to travel, whereas those who would do the same with the family may be classified as “voter trucking” yet the Constitution in Article 80 (c), provides that “every Liberian citizen has the right to register and vote in their constituency, either in person or by absentee ballot.”

4.6. Subjective citizen screening
The Liberia Immigration Service (LIS) carried out its mandate during the BVR exercise exceptionally well in almost all the BVR centers visited. However, the subjective nature of the “citizenship test”, where the officer has the final word on those with questionable citizenship, presents a challenge in the face of a tightly contested election. Providing a nationwide identification could resolve several challenges related to the registration of non-Liberians in counties that share borders with Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Sierra Leone. EISA is concerned that this recommendation has been made by observer missions in response to the issue of voter trucking in past elections, 2017 and 2020, and yet Liberia has still not moved towards solving this issue. As a result, in most rural BVR centers, EISA observed that NEC and immigration officials resorted to oral testimonies, language, names, and accents to verify nationality and
The lack of IDs, lack of population census data, and clarification on the boundary delimitation process also compound the problems of voter trucking and underage voting.  

4.7. Pre-election campaigning
Pre-election campaigning was noted as a cross-cutting issue in the two phases of the BVR. The Chairperson of NEC is quoted appealing to parties, coalitions, independents and all stakeholders to desist from the practice:

“Finally, as per the earlier pronouncement, the commission reiterates that documentation of violations of the campaign regulations is ongoing since 5 May 2023. The commission also notes that since the issuance of the 15 May 2023 ultimatum for would-be aspirants to remove or take down their paraphernalia, the Commission, in monitoring, observed that in many of the fifteen (15) counties, it is unheeded. The commission notes that it will apply appropriate measures for these violations. The Commission reminds all aspirants that the campaign period runs from 5 August 2023 to 8 October 2023.”

The EISA IEOM noted that political aspirants morphed their role of informing citizens about the BVR process with their intent to contest elections. This made it even more difficult to draw the line between campaigning and civic and voter education efforts.

4.8. Accessibility of BVR centers to registrants
The IEOM noted that registrants cited challenges in accessing BVR centers and that the location of BVR centers continued to be a challenge during the exhibition period as well. EISA observers reported on several cases whereby the BVR centers were placed too far from villages requiring people to walk long distances. This was also detrimental to the participation of the elderly, PWDs, lactating mothers and pregnant women. The IEOM notes that this trend continued into the exhibition process, whereby registrants still had to travel the same distances during the exhibition as the NEC maintained the same BVR centers as exhibition centers. The IEOM encourages the NEC to strongly consider the location of centers so that they are within walking distance. This is even more crucial for PWDs, considering that article 3.2 (c) states that:

“The location and arrangement of the registration centers shall, to the extent, which is reasonably and practicably possible, be accessible to persons with disabilities.”

5. Reflections on the utility of BVR in improving credibility.

The EISA IEOM commends the way the NEC conducted BVR for the first time in Liberia. Considering that in its 2017 IEOM report, EISA found that errors in the OMR system resulted in voters being assigned to wrong

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polling stations and on election day there were cases where persons with voters’ cards could not be found on the final registration roll. Generally, the adoption of BVR is useful in preventing multiple enrolments and fraud using combinations of unique physical characteristics and bio data. In a context like Liberia, where national identity is not readily available to everyone and borders with neighboring countries are porous, the introduction of a machine-printed and coded voters card provides proof against manipulation and illegal enrolment for the purpose of influencing the election outcome. The enrolment of fingerprints also presented a major blockade to double registration. The NEC has also reiterated that the adoption of BVR is aimed at producing a credible voters roll. The BVR process should be further strengthened through effective screening measures to ensure that ineligible persons do not bypass the system. Specifically, the IEOM noted challenges related to allegations that foreigners whose lineage is close to Liberia or those who have settled within Liberia especially border counties such as Lofa, Nimba and Grand Gedeh succeeded in registering.

5.1. Registration anywhere and deduplication
The IEOM is of the view that the NEC can explore other functionalities of BVR especially with regards to enabling registrants to register at any center of their choice. By so doing, voter registration details from different BVR centers would be consolidated, deduplicated, and PRR produced for each of the polling centers. NEC may have missed the opportunity to allow citizens to register wherever they are, and their details would be posted to the polling station of choice. The miss is because of a gap with the citizen identity system, which in some instances requires members of the community to vouch for one’s residence.

5.2. Biometrics need to be supported by a functional civil registry.
The IEOM noted the introduction of BVR in Liberia as a positive development. The BVR kits utilised facial recognition technology and fingerprint scanners to register voters in efforts to detect and reduce potential fraud, i.e., multiple registrations. Yet, it remains important to understand that biometric technology cannot solve all voter registration problems and has its limitations. The full capacity of BVR to produce a credible registration roll can be unlocked through the existence of a functional national civil registry among other elements such as:

- **Legislation:** The legal framework governing the collection, storage, and use of biometric data must be clear and comprehensive.

- **Procedures:** Clear and documented procedures must be in place to ensure that biometric data is collected, stored, and used in a secure and ethical manner.

- **Eligibility and identification requirements:** The criteria for determining who is eligible to provide biometric data, and how that data is used to identify individuals, must be clear and transparent.

- **Staff recruitment and training:** Staff responsible for collecting, storing, and using biometric data must be properly trained in the relevant laws and procedures.

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International standards: The collection, storage, and use of biometric data must comply with international standards for privacy and security.

The IEOM noted that Liberia still does not have a functional civil registry, and this hampers the NEC’s capacity in cleaning the registration roll for accuracy. The IEOM noted that Section 2.31 of the New Elections Law mandates the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare at the county level to share names of all deceased persons above the age of 18 years with the NEC Magistrates every December. The IEOM is of the view that if adhered to, would some extent assists in the cleaning of the registration roll but remains insufficient. Political will and commitment are necessary to resolve the long-standing issue of establishing a functional civil registry in Liberia.

5.3. Limited capacity of Biometrics to detect underage registrants and foreign nationals.

The challenges of voter trucking, especially in border counties and underage voting conveys that BVR requires effective screening measures to prevent electoral fraud. In this regard, the BVR process depends on concerted stakeholder efforts in ensuring that only eligible persons are allowed to register. In this regard, BVR does not remove the burden of proving eligibility of a registrant beyond reasonable doubt. The issues of voter trucking and underage registration as reported by the IEOM threatened the integrity and credibility of the registration roll and therefore required the NEC to implement measures to effectively address reported cases.

6. Deduplication Exercise

The NEC conducted a thorough deduplication process using biometric data from nearly 2.5 million registrants collected during phases one and two of the BVR exercise. This process involved advanced algorithms to identify and remove instances of multiple registrations and suspected underage registrants to ensure each voter is registered only once. The deduplication and adjudication of voter information were initiated in April 2023, with data synchronization from Phase I and II being carried out through the Central Management System (CMS) supported by Laxton Group and Neurotechnology company and managed by the NEC Data Center Department. The IEOM was granted access to observe the deduplication process at the national level. In so doing the NEC conveyed a respect for transparency and accountability.

To identify duplicate registrations, the NEC utilized facial recognition software, fingerprint comparisons, and cross-referencing of names, birth dates, and other details against all applicants. This process provided a list of potential duplicates and underage voters for manual verification by NEC staff. Instances of duplicate and underage registrations were identified and deactivated for further investigation through deduplication and adjudication processes. Through this process, the NEC recorded a total of 2,488,904 registrants from the Biometric Voters Registration (BVR) exercise. Among them, 27,192 were flagged as duplicates and 529 as suspected underage across all 15 counties. EISA was informed that ineligible registrants would be removed, and cases involving potential criminal motives referred to the Ministry of
Justice for appropriate action. EISA noted that the NEC’s application of these procedures aligns with international best practices for using biometric data to verify and clean the voters’ roll, thereby enhancing the credibility and transparency of this essential document for the upcoming 10 October 2023 elections.

Regarding the investigation of the 529 suspected underage registrants, the NEC publicly emphasized its cautious approach due to the potential privacy concerns related to minors. The election law of Liberia grants the right to register and participate in electoral processes to Liberian citizens aged 18 and above. Furthermore, the NEC announced the successful capture of data for 534,286 individuals through an online personal data entry platform. According to NEC, this platform significantly reduced the processing time required for registrants at the registration centers, as stated by the NEC. Adjustments to the data were made after the investigation of duplicate and suspected underage cases following the completion of the Exhibition of the Provisional Registration Roll (PRR).

7. Exhibition of the Provisional Registration Roll

EISA LTOs observed the exhibition process which commenced on 12 June 2023 and ended on 17 June 2023, with centers operating from 8:00 to 17:00 daily. The exhibition process provided an opportunity for stakeholders to inspect the Provisional Registration Roll (PRR) for errors, omissions, suspected underage registrants and duplications to allow the NEC to make necessary corrections and finalize accordingly.

The NEC is mandated to conduct the BVR exhibition process in accordance with section 2.9(k) of the New Elections Law. The exhibition process entails that the PRR for each Voter Registration Center and proposed polling center should be displayed for the public to confirm that their personal details were captured correctly. It also provided an opportunity for stakeholders to raise objections to the inclusion of ineligible persons in the PRR. To this effect, the IEOM noted that in 45% of voter registration centers visited (142 centers), registrants also checked details for other relatives and friends. There was also a very low presence of security officials across counties during the exhibition. The NEC’s performance in terms of managing human resources continues to be an issue of concern as raised during the BVR phases one and two. The NEC has been inconsistent in the provision of stipends to ensure that NEC officials are able to sustain themselves during deployment. The IEOM teams also noted gaps in the NEC’s provisions for the welfare and facilitation of the movement of its officers to their assigned exhibition centers for temporary staff.

EISA LTOs observed BVR procedures in 142 exhibition centers in six counties noting that these exhibition centers were the very same centers in which the electorate registered to vote. The NEC was adequately prepared as observers noted that 98% of stations visited had all the required election material. The

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8 The NEC has powers and duties to: ‘Maintain a register of all qualified voters which shall be subject to inspection under the provision of this title.’
9 Grand Bassa, Margibi, Rivercess, Nimba, Bong and Lofa
elderly, pregnant women, nursing mothers and PWDs were given priority access in 98% of centers visited. This best international practice was observed during phases one and two of the BVR process. A copy of the PRR was displayed in 95% of the exhibition centers visited whilst officials in the remainder of the centers cited the rainy conditions and lack of sticking tape as reasons why the PRR could not be posted. In Biafra Community Hall (Grand Bassa) for instance, local officials resorted to the use of cassava starch for pasting the PRR on the wall. The IEOM observed that besides the PRR, excluded duplicated records were also posted in various exhibition centers. LTOs noted that some citizens who duplicated their registrations may have done so for many reasons, including fraudulent intention, others may have duplicated without fraudulent intention but due to the breakdowns of the machines during BVR. In all centers observed, there were no objections to inclusion.

7.1. Challenges noted in the Exhibition process.

7.1.1. Low turnout

The EISA IEOM noted that the numbers of people turning out to check the PRR at exhibition centers were very low across all counties observed. At Tambah Taylor Public Elementary School center, the team observed very long queues during the BVR exercise and the center with the highest voter population in Lower Lofa, out of the 4064 registered voters, just about 442 people confirmed their details at around 3.30 pm on the last day of the exhibition exercise. Similarly, LTOs in Grand Bassa reported that the turnout was very low, particularly in rural areas. In Daybay Town Market center in District 5 of Grand Bassa County, five corrections and 15 confirmations were recorded making a total of 19 registrants who reported to the center out of 1334 registered during BVR. Based on EISA’s observations, this means that registration at the Daybay Town Market center stood at 1.4% on the 16 June 2023, a day before the end of the BVR period.

Based on stakeholder consultations, there are several reasons that can be attributed to the low turnout. First, there is a general lack of interest in the process among the electorate as well as misunderstandings among residents regarding the purpose of the exhibition process. Secondly, unlike BVR phases one and two, civic and voter education initiatives were almost non-existent during the exhibition process. In Foya, one of the reasons cited for the low turnout is the low level of public trust in NEC officials. NEC officials shared that people were reluctant to show their cards to NEC officials, fearing their details will be taken. This fear corresponds to concerns expressed by some stakeholders about the buying of voter cards by some political actors.

7.1.2. Travelling to NEC Magistrates office as a disincentive

The travel costs associated with travelling to NEC magisterial offices for corrections were a disincentive for voters. EISA LTOs noted that the requirement for registrants to travel to NEC magisterial offices for issues related to correction, inclusion and objection is financially and physically taxing for the electorate due to long distances to between communities and NEC offices. EISA LTOs in upper Nimba reported a case wherein a registrant refused the advice of NEC officials to go to the NEC magisterial office in Saniquelle (60 km away and on personal cost) for redress due to the long distance and lack of money to travel. NEC staff informed LTOs that once the registrants learned that NEC would not provide transport, they refused to make corrections and went away with their cards. The accessibility of designated registration centers and polling centers continues to be a challenge for citizens as election day
approaches. In this regard, the allocation of registration/voting centers should not be made based on the electoral population only but also distances between localities. It is observed that registration centers are very far from one another and this negatively impacted people’s participation in the electoral process.

7.1.3. The professionalism of NEC officials

EISA LTOs noted that the professionalism of NEC officials in terms of adherence to working times was not standard across the centers. LTOs observed that most exhibition centers visited did not have the full complement of NEC staff. The expectation in accordance with procedures was that each center should have had two NEC officers (one electoral officer and one electoral clerk). In most of the centers visited there was one official at the center and reasons given for the other official was that they had briefly stepped out. There were also a few exceptions of deserted exhibition centers in Lofa. LTOs reported that on the sixth day of the exhibition exercise, the center at the Vezela Public School in Electoral District 4 was not set up, and the exhibition staff was not present. Similarly, the exhibition center at the Yandolun Public School in Electoral District 2 was closed at 2.30 pm. The officers only returned after a community member went to call them from their guesthouse when the team arrived.

7.1.4. The plausible underestimation of underage registrants

LTOs raised concern about an underestimation of the underage voters in the voter register. Considering that in Lofa, LTOs traced five underage registrants whose names were in the register but were not included in the list of underage registrants flagged by NEC HQ. In Upper Lofa, the names of two underage registrants, were not found in the list of suspected underage registrants flagged out by NEC HQ. In Lower Lofa, LTOs tracked three cases reported by parents during the LCC interaction meeting with NEC Magistrate. Noting that those names still appeared in the PRR at their respective registration centers (Foya Old Market, Foya Town Hall and Tambah Taylor Public Elementary School).

7.1.5. Damage to posted PRR

LTOs reported cases of damaged PRR in some exhibition centers and noted a few cases of posted excluded duplicated records, and underage lists that were destroyed. Though it is an electoral offense to the election law, magisterial offices declared not having any capacity of action against the
perpetrators who committed such offenses at night. In other stations, the rain was attributed to the damage.

7.1.6. Anomalies in the system
In addition, NEC recorded anomalies where some registrant’s fingerprints weren’t well captured in the system. Rivercess had five anomalies and the NEC sent a notice for them to report to the office for recapturing yet, none of them turned out due to financial and proximity to the NEC office. It was also recorded that a few applicants who used the online registration system had issues with their birth dates as their date of birth was pushed back (not reflecting the actual date as provided for by the registrants).

In Grand Bassa, LTOs noted that magisterial offices did not renew the contracts of temporal staff who registered underage persons during BVR. NEC Magistrates indicated that this was a decision from the NEC Headquarters to suspend their contracts while further investigations are being conducted. They were suspected of having been corrupted by politicians who may have paid money for such registrations. In Rivercess county, the magistrate engaged in negotiations with the parents of the 11 cases of alleged underage registrants of whom 3 returned their 3 voter cards to the magistrate.

7.1.7. Corrections at Magisterial offices
The IEOM noted that registrants that needed their details to be corrected had to travel from exhibition centers to NEC magisterial offices for corrections. The conduct of corrections at the magisterial level was an additional hurdle for registrants due to travel costs and distance. At Magisterial offices, LTOs observed that operational centers were set up and making corrections on voter cards. In Rivercess county, on the second day of the exhibition, particulars of seven voter cards were corrected at the time LTOs arrived. In Margibi county on the third day of the exhibition, particulars of 35 voter cards were corrected at the time of LTO’s arrival. Corrections were done immediately in the presence of the applicant and the newly corrected voter card was issued to the registrant whereas the incorrect voter card was kept by the magisterial office.

7.1.8. Low presence of domestic observers and party agents
EISA LTOs reported that the presence of domestic observers and party agents was significantly low during the exhibition process. There is a need for capacity building efforts to ensure that political parties and civil society can effectively follow all processes of the election.

8. Gender and Social Inclusion Mainstreaming
An integral component of the IEOMs methodology is to assess levels of gender integration and social inclusion in political processes. In this respect, EISA LTOs have interacted with civil society groups to understand both prospects and challenges faced by women, youth and PWDs in participating in elections. Inclusivity is an important principle in the voter registration process, hence the IEOM focused on eligibility requirements, accessibility, and prioritization of marginalized groups. The IEOM notes that Liberia’s elections laws reflect the principle of inclusivity. As best international practice, the IEOM notes that the law also provides for the registration of internally displaced persons/returning refugees.  

10 See Section 3.3.A of the New Elections Law
8.1. Women's Political Participation

Liberia is a signatory to several international treaties on women's equal political participation. Despite these commitments, women's political representation in the Liberia National Legislature has declined since 2006, dropping from 16% to 10% in 2021.\(^{11}\) Factors explaining the limited women's political participation and representation include structural barriers rooted in the patriarchal system and socialization, institutional set-ups and arrangements designed by and for men and capacity and resource gaps between both sexes. It is within this context that political parties and the National Elections Commission (NEC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 11 May 2023, committing political parties to an affirmative action to grant a minimum of 30% of candidate listings to women in the upcoming 2023 General Elections.\(^{12}\) At the county level, the IEOM has observed prospective women representative aspirants for various electoral districts, likely to vie on party tickets or as independent candidates. The upcoming candidate nomination process will ascertain whether political parties will attain the 30% threshold for women participation. Beyond that, EISA has noted women's role in other aspects of the electoral process, including serving as party agents, observers, registration and exhibition workers, voter-education officers, and voters.

To facilitate the participation of pregnant women and lactating mothers in the voter registration process, NEC provided priority access at the BVR centers, including separate queues and seating arrangements for them. Also, CVE messaging targeted women, encouraging them to turn out and register, especially in rural areas. The CVE outreach strategies included places frequented by women, such as markets, water points, churches, and health centers. NEC also accredited women-based organizations to conduct CVE campaigns.

Findings are mixed on the NEC's efforts to include women as temporal staff for the BVR and Exhibition exercises, with some level of women inclusion as registration officers but limited women inclusion in supervisory roles. However, very few women were recruited for the middle-level/supervisor-level roles in the county, both for the BVR and exhibition exercises. EISA applauds the UN Women, the NEC Gender Department, and civil society organizations, particularly women's organizations, for their efforts in promoting women's political participation during the registration process and encourages them to continue and increase their efforts towards elections.

8.2. Youth

In the two phases of the BVR process, the IEOM noted a heightened interest by youths, who are the biggest demographic of first-time voters. The youth, some of whom are ex-combatants, face formidable challenges, including limited access to employment and stable sources of income and sexual and reproductive health information and services. Early marriage and teenage pregnancy are common

among girls, according to UNFPA\textsuperscript{13}. Several reasons, including having a form of an identity document, desire to see change and interest to ensure their candidates get their vote for the first time, could be gleaned as to why such an interest was witnessed during the BVR and Exhibition. Despite the challenges associated with young people’s participation and where political party inaugural activities have taken place, youths have played a pivotal role in mobilizing each other to participate in political processes. Most of the youths worked with NEC as temporary staffers for the BVR and Exhibition processes, while others took active roles with community-based organizations and civil society organizations that were undertaking CVE for the BVR and Exhibition processes.

On the other hand, it is worth noting that youths' vulnerability to potential political abuse remained high in all the BVR and Exhibition process phases. Young people have been particularly vulnerable to the manipulation of political actors as seen in their engagement as under-age registrants, and protectors of political aspirants through paramilitary wings.

8.3. Persons With Disabilities
The IEOM notes that the NEC has made great strides in improving the engagement of PWDs in the BVR process. In accordance with section 3.2 (b) of the New Elections Law, registration officers should give preference to PWDs. At BVR center level, there were efforts to ensure PWDs could be assisted on a preferential basis by allowing them to go straight and get registered. The NEC through its CVE cells, engaged with several PWD-led CSOs to target PWDs during both phases of BVR. The use of PWD CVE educators is a good practice that harnesses principles for inclusivity. Noting that PWDs are most likely to hear the message if it is delivered by those who face the same challenges they face. The EISA IEOM marks this as a good practice that contains valuable lessons for the international community. The NEC recruited some staffers who had some disabilities, which is a commendable and important inclusion in their staffing practices.

EISA believes that there is room for improvement regarding the experiences of PWDs as registrants. In both BVR phases as well as Exhibition, 33.3% of the BVR centers observed were not accessible to persons with disability, and this contributes to poor participation of persons with disability\textsuperscript{14}. Issues limiting the participation of persons with disabilities included: access to stations, assistance for visually impaired and deaf citizens and inconsistent application of training procedures by NEC staff in some stations. The IEOM noted that due to the type of infrastructure that NEC gets to conduct its activities, it is at times difficult to get disability-friendly centers however, it is recommended that NEC provides ramps or, in other circumstances, use places that have no access challenges.

\textsuperscript{13}https://liberia.unfpa.org/en/topics/adolescents-and-youth-
9. Cross cutting issues

9.1. Media

EISA LTOs have recognized the important space that community radio stations occupy at county level. They operate in a largely unregulated and poorly resourced landscape that makes instances of exploitation by political aspirants highly likely. The polarization is due to radio stations owned by politicians propagating politically biased agendas and reporting. This adds to the complexity of the mandate of the media to provide an equal playing field for all aspiring candidates to relay their messages during elections. The polarization is also fueling the spread of disinformation/misinformation and hate speech, with cases of radio talk shows being used as avenues to launch attacks against political rivals. There is a need for more robust verification of media houses in the lead up to elections.

The EISA IEOM is appreciative of the role that community radio stations played in informing citizens about the importance of registering to vote during the BVR process. Even though the media provided basic information about the BVR process on a voluntary basis, there were minimal signs of engagement with the NEC in ensuring the quality of information shared with listeners.

The IEOM also noted the efforts of technical partners such as Internews and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to support robust mechanisms for media practitioners through consultation and capacity building for balanced and informed reporting on the BVR exercise. The IEOM also noted the use of community radio stations by the NEC to enhance its public outreach on BVR messaging. However, the IEOM is of the view that collaboration between the NEC and media should be robust and proactive as the country moves towards elections.

9.2. Civic education

CVE for the BVR exercises and, subsequently, the exhibition of the Provisional Voter Register was primarily conducted by accredited civil society organizations and other stakeholders, including media, political parties, and religious institutions. NEC commenced CVE activities for the 2023 electoral period with the official launch of the CVE campaign on 24 February 2023. For this electoral cycle, NEC adopted a CVE cell approach that entails working with Community-Based Organizations (CBO) vetted and selected by NEC to undertake CVE in their respective communities. Through a competitive bidding process, NEC recruited 400 CBOs, including women, youth, and PwD-focused groups, to conduct CVE activities nationwide, with each electoral district assigned to one community-based organization. According to NEC CVE department, 81 CVE cells were established for the conduct of CVE across the 73 districts of Liberia. CVE activities to create awareness of the new biometric exercise were simultaneously carried out during the two BVR phases across the 73 districts of Liberia. CVE activities to create awareness of the exhibition of the Provisional Voter Register were also conducted from 12-18 June 2023 to create awareness of the exhibition of the PRR.

The IEOM noted a regression in the conduct of CVE during the BVR process and exhibition periods. During the exhibition process, LTOs reported lower levels of CVE efforts in all counties observed. CVE initiatives were noted in 20% of the exhibition centers visited between 12-17 June 2023. This was a
missed opportunity considering that CVE agents were well within their rights to conduct CVE in accordance with the electoral calendar. In following up, the NEC cited several challenges for the regression in CVE efforts during exhibition. Noting that logistical challenges delayed the dispatch of CVE materials from Monrovia. Due to financial constraints faced by the NEC, CVE was negatively impacted. The IEOM learnt that for exhibition, the NEC printed a total of 25000 A2 posters to service 81 cells nationwide.

10. Publication of Registration Statistics

At the conclusion of BVR phases one and two, the NEC published preliminary BVR figures for each BVR center across all 15 counties. EISA acknowledges that the NEC has maintained its practice of providing gender-disaggregated data. This is in line with best international practice and is invaluable in ensuring inclusive election management. Before the exhibition, the National Elections Commission (NEC) announced a preliminary figure of 2,498,904 registered voters. However, after identifying 27,192 duplicate records and flagging 529 suspected underage registrants, the total number of active registrants was 2,471,183. Both active registrants and suspected underage registrants were exhibited during the period stated above.

EISA also conducted a comparative analysis of the final registration figures with the final registration figures in the 2020 by-elections. Considering that voter registration for 2023 was conducted without finalized population census figures due to a contestation of the validity of the provisional statistics released by the Liberia Institute for Statistics and Geo-Information Services (LIGIS). As a result, the boundary delimitation process was also not done and hence the IEOM notes that the NEC will utilize the same constituencies utilized in the 2017 elections. This conflicts Liberia’s Constitution, which necessitates a reapportioning of constituencies (to reflect population figures) based on the conduct of a national census before elections.

16 As reported by Liberia’s mainstream media: https://thenewdawnliberia.com/liberias-population-hits-5-2m/, https://www.liberianobserver.com/liberia-census-results-are-voodoo-numbers
17 See article 80(d)&(e) of Liberia’s Constitution
Comparing the 2020 and 2023 final voter registration data published by the National Election Commission (NEC), off the 15 counties of Liberia, 9 counties (Bomi, Gbarpolu, Grand Bassa, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, Lofa, River Gee, Rivercess and Sinoe) reported a decrease in voter registration figures.

While 6 counties (Bong, Grand Cape Mount, Margibi, Maryland, Montserrado, and Nimba) reported an increase in voter registration figures.

The IEOM noted that the NEC delayed the release of final registration figures that were due for release on 1 July 2023 in accordance with the electoral calendar.

Having missed its deadline for the release of the FRR by 16 days, the NEC on 17 July 2023, announced the final number of registered voters for the October 10, 2023, general elections. This was an improvement as the EISA IEOM noted that in 2017, the NEC released final registration figures on 28 July 2017.

The total number of registered voters is 2,471,617, with 1,237,257 females and 1,234,360 males. Based on the final figures, this is a 13.2% increase from the 2,183,629 people registered in 2017. The IEOM is engaged the NEC for a detailed breakdown of the number of underage registrants, foreigners and deceased that were removed from the roll.
Official NEC Figures as announced during 6 June 2023 Press Release

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Preliminary Figures</th>
<th>Post-Exhibition Figures</th>
<th>Adjustment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>1,241,414</td>
<td>1,237,063</td>
<td>4,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>1,257,490</td>
<td>1,234,120</td>
<td>23,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female % of total</td>
<td>49,68%</td>
<td>50,06%</td>
<td>18,62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,498,904</td>
<td>2,471,183</td>
<td>27,721</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The exhibition and cleaning of the voters’ roll saw 27,721 registrations cleaned from the preliminary register. Unsurprisingly, half of these were in Montserrado county (13,428). It is noteworthy that because of a disproportionately high number of male registrations removed, the overall ratio between men and women in the final figures shifted from slightly less than half of the roll being women to slightly more. 27,192 of the 27,721 removals were due to evidence of multiple registration. While this figure may seem large, the NEC reported that these 27,192 multiple registrations were perpetrated for the most part by 3,634 persons. Of these, the NEC noted that for 679 multiple registrations, the applicant did not collect more than 1 card. The NEC reported the remaining 2,955 persons who signed and collected more than 1 registration card and were identified using biometric analysis and manual verification to the Ministry of Justice for prosecution. Of the 529 instances where a voter was suspected to be underage and registered on the voters’ roll, a total of 30 were confirmed to be underage and removed. The NEC took the decision to retain the remaining 499 entries on the system as there was insufficient evidence available to render these voter entries inactive on the roll. A further 95 entries were removed from the roll related to the voter being deceased, the voter’s details being re-issued due to anomalies in the capturing of their original entry or on the basis that they were not Liberian citizens. The final voters’ roll figure for the 2023 elections is therefore 2,471,617 voters.

Usage of online registration portal during registration, disaggregated by county and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomi</td>
<td>3,072</td>
<td>3,667</td>
<td>6,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bong</td>
<td>19,818</td>
<td>19,398</td>
<td>39,216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbarpolu</td>
<td>1,095</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>2,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Bassa</td>
<td>8,175</td>
<td>8,329</td>
<td>16,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Cape Mount</td>
<td>5,306</td>
<td>5,965</td>
<td>11,271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Gedeh</td>
<td>1,455</td>
<td>1,956</td>
<td>3,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Kru</td>
<td>2,208</td>
<td>2,350</td>
<td>4,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lofa</td>
<td>15,834</td>
<td>15,140</td>
<td>30,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margibi</td>
<td>24,253</td>
<td>23,948</td>
<td>48,201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>4,501</td>
<td>4,207</td>
<td>8,708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrado</td>
<td>160,333</td>
<td>165,502</td>
<td>325,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimba</td>
<td>13,850</td>
<td>14,740</td>
<td>28,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Gee</td>
<td>814</td>
<td>1,122</td>
<td>1,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivercess</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>1,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinoe</td>
<td>2,106</td>
<td>2,807</td>
<td>4,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>263,376</td>
<td>270,910</td>
<td>534,286</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: NEC data center*
The use of the NEC’s online portal to pre-register and facilitate a smoother and time-saving process during the registration worked well, although as the table above indicates, adoption rates of the system remain low. The use of the online registration process during the first application of the BVR kits during Liberia voter registration created anxiety among some stakeholders who felt that the online registration was in some way more vulnerable to fraudulent applications and abuse. These concerns can be addressed through clear messaging and education among voters. The introduction of this innovation worked well, improved the speed of registration and the use of this option should be further popularized in future registration exercises by the NEC and stakeholders in their CVE activities. The data indicates that the portal was most widely used in Montserrado county, and that some of the remote counties where the greatest benefits of the online registration portal could be felt, did not use the portal to the same extent as the more populated provinces.

### Persons with disabilities registering to vote, disaggregated by county and gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bomi</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bong</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gbarpolu</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Bassa</td>
<td>844</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>1,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Cape Mount</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Gedeh</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Kru</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lofa</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margibi</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montserrado</td>
<td>1,946</td>
<td>1,405</td>
<td>3,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimba</td>
<td>1,782</td>
<td>1,561</td>
<td>3,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Gee</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rivercess</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinoe</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>7,048</td>
<td>5,351</td>
<td>12,399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NEC data center

With 12,399 registrations, persons living with disabilities are 0.5% of the total voters’ roll. It is noteworthy that the ratio of women registrants living with disabilities is proportionately higher than the overall ratio of men and women in the comprehensive voters’ roll. While accurate and up-to-date figures on the proportion of Liberian adults living with disabilities are not readily available, based on the obstacles to registration witnessed by EISA’s observers, this figure is most likely on the low end, as multiple and significant barriers to the registration of persons living with disabilities were observed during the registration. While several of these barriers are not directly within NEC’s control, the impact of the travel distances between registration centers, access to school buildings and raised platforms, and other practical requirements can be improved with the engagement of NEC and relevant government ministries and institutions.
11. Conclusion

The IEOM has had the privilege of following the implementation of BVR in Liberia for the first time. The IEOM is cognizant of the significant challenges encountered by the NEC which significantly hampered levels of participation. Final registration figures convey that the NEC succeeded in casting the net wider, recording an increase in the number of registrants compared to the 2017 registration exercise.

The IEOM recognizes that the introduction of BVR in Liberia is contributing positively to historical challenges around the credibility of the registration roll. Yet the slow implementation of a functional, universal civil registry coupled with contention around the population census exercise hinder further leverage of the potential of BVR. The lack of consensus on population exercise figures also entails that the NEC is not able to satisfy the constitutional requirement for the reapportionment of constituencies before elections. This situation has also had an adverse impact on the rights of citizens to access BVR and exhibition centers during the registration process due to the low proximity of NEC magisterial offices and registration centers to communities.

EISA also appreciates that gaps in the legal framework are detrimental to the NECs ability to effectively act against electoral malpractices. Reported cases of underage registration and voter trucking resulted in raised levels of dissatisfaction directed at the NEC. The IEOM remains encouraged by the active participation of Liberians in the electoral process. Particularly the engagement of women, youth and PWDs as NEC officials, CVE officers and registrants is an example of good practice. The IEOM notes the efforts taken by the NEC to clean the voters roll by conducting a deduplication exercise and enabling public scrutiny through the exhibition process. The EISA IEOM calls for all stakeholders to persevere in maintaining conducive environment of other crucial electoral exercises.
12. Recommendations

To NEC:

1. NEC should ensure effective public awareness and voter education campaigns to enlighten the public on the provisional voters’ roll exhibition and its significance. This could include developing voter information toolkits for educators and improving coordination among partner organizations and community-based organizations.

2. Provide legal and procedural clarity on voter trucking: It is crucial to seek further clarification from the appropriate authorities on what actions constitute voter trucking since the law does not specify. NEC should offer a clear definition to ensure individuals are aware of what constitutes voter trucking and its consequences.

3. Raise awareness on electoral laws: To ensure free and fair elections, many people may need to be educated on the laws surrounding voter registration and trucking. Conducting public awareness campaigns and workshops can help in raising awareness among the public on the importance of adhering to electoral laws.

4. Strengthen penalties for voter trucking: To discourage individuals from engaging in illegal activities such as voter trucking, there may be a need to increase the penalties for such offenses. Increasing the fines and imprisonment time for those caught can serve as a stronger deterrent and emphasize the severity of the offense.

5. Address all complaints related to pre-campaigning and ensure all political parties engaging in pre-campaigning are given the appropriate censure and fines.

6. EISA encourages the Liberian legislature, NEC and Ministry of Justice to review the existing legislation to clarify and enhance the legal requirements for eligibility, the practical application of these requirements, and means to identify and deter future incidences of voter trucking in Liberia.

7. Be innovative in the placement of BVR centers to improve accessibility for citizens.

8. The NEC explore other functionalities of BVR especially with regards to enabling registrants to register at any center of their choice. This can reduce incentives for engaging in voter trucking and improve convenience for registrants.


10. Strengthen communication strategies This could include extending IPCC meetings to the county level and improving communication between the magistrates and NEC headquarters.

To Government:

11. The legislature should consider the passage of legislation that will enable eligible citizens, including those who turn eighteen between the time of registration and election day an opportunity to register and vote. This would be in line with international good practice and democratic principles.

12. Resolve the long-standing issue of establishing a functional civil registry to strengthen the NECs capacity to screen registrants and voters.
To Immigration Officials:
13. Consider an integrated regional approach in addressing the long-standing issue of foreign registration and foreign voting during elections.

To political parties:
14. To ensure their representatives and agents are well trained to follow through the remaining biometric voter registration processes.
15. To avoid mobilising voters along ethnic, tribalism lines, use of divisive language, pre-campaigning, and voter trucking throughout the electoral process.

Civil Society Organisations
16. Collaborate with the NEC to enhance civic and voter education initiatives, with particular emphasis on marginalized communities, women, youth, persons with disabilities, and rural populations.
17. Support the drive to boost women’s political participation, particularly as leaders within political parties and in public administration.

Media
18. Strive to ensure balanced and accurate election coverage. Avoid providing a forum for hate speech, defamation, and incitement to violence and discrimination.
19. Endeavour to provide equal coverage for all political parties to relay their message, especially as the country heads to the candidate nomination stage.

Youth
20. To act responsibly and safeguard their right to freely participate in the electoral process and resist all forms of manipulation.

About EISA: The Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) is a continental not-for-profit organization located in Johannesburg, South Africa, and Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire with field offices in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Niger, Liberia Chad, and Sudan. EISA has continental and sub-regional programs in the field of elections and democracy throughout Africa. EISA strives for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, citizen participation, and the strengthening of political institutions for sustainable democracy in Africa.

About USAID Support to EISA-IEOM to Liberia: The USAID-funded EISA International Election Observation Mission (EISA-IEOM) Activity seeks to enhance the integrity of the 2023 Liberia Presidential and Legislative elections through the deployment of an independent international election observer mission (EOM) to monitor, assess and report on all phases of the electoral process in accordance with international and regional benchmarks. The IEOM is implemented in close coordination with and the financial support of USAID/Liberia and will complement the efforts of other electoral stakeholders. EISA-IEOM has deployed international LTOs across Liberia to observe BVR Phase 2 of the registration and will compile a Phase 2 and comprehensive BVR report at the conclusion of the inspection process.

Please find the LTOs Arrival Statement: https://eisa.org/pdf/lib2023ltoarrival.pdf
For all resources, including EISA statements and reports from the 2017 Liberia Elections https://eisa.org/epp-liberia.php