LOCALISED PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE DURING ELECTIONS IN AFRICAN COUNTRIES: THE 2019 ELECTION IN SOUTH AFRICAN AND MOZAMBIQUE.
About EISA

Since its inception in July 1996 EISA has established itself as a leading institution and influential player dealing with elections and democracy related issues in the African continent. The organisation’s Strategic Goals are:

- Electoral processes are inclusive, transparent, peaceful and well-managed;
- Citizens participate effectively in the democratic process;
- Political institutions and processes are democratic and function effectively.

The vision of EISA is “an African continent where democratic governance, human rights and citizen participation are upheld in a peaceful environment”. This vision is executed through the organisational mission of "striving for excellence in the promotion of credible elections, participatory democracy, a human rights culture, and the strengthening of governance institutions for the consolidation of democracy in Africa”.

Having supported and/or observed over 100 electoral processes in Africa, EISA has extensive experience in formulating, structuring and implementing democratic and electoral initiatives. It has built an internationally recognised centre for policy, research and information and provides this service to electoral management bodies, political parties, parliaments, national and local governments and civil society organisations in a variety of areas, such as voter and civic education and electoral assistance and observation. Besides its expanded geographical scope, the Institute has, for the past several years, been increasingly working in new in-between election areas along the electoral and parliamentary cycle, including constitution building processes, legislative strengthening, conflict management and transformation, political party development, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and local governance and decentralisation.

EISA provides technical assistance to inter-governmental institutions, such as the African Union, the Pan-African Parliament and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), to reinforce their capacity in the elections and democracy field. The Institute has signed Memoranda of Understanding with the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC); the East African Community (EAC); the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA). EISA also regularly works with the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

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The Institute is overseen by an international Board of Directors and has 70 full time staff.
Acknowledgments

This report is a product of EISA’s continued collaboration with the University of Witwatersrand (Wits) and the University of Michigan in tracking localised patterns of violence during elections in African countries through quantitative research methods. The project is generously supported by the funds from University of Michigan through the Carnegie Foundation.

The project is underpinned by a real-time and statistical data collection framework that is utilized by EISA election observers to report on polling proceedings at polling stations on election day.

Introduction

This report consists of five research paper series which contributes to the analytical framework of the project. The papers were written by students who at the time of writing were post-graduate students in the International Relations Department at the University of Witwatersrand. Their papers were reviewed and edited by the EISA team, a research team from the University of Michigan, independent researcher Dr Celso Monjane and copy-edited by Media Meme. These research papers are an important milestone in realising this project’s goal of improving the utility of data collected by international observers for the development of academic theories and scholarly research. EISA thanks each author for basing their papers on EISA’s election observer reports.

Summary of the papers

Pranish Desai, tackles the impact of rioting; service delivery protests, strikes and protest actions, on voter turnout across all 278 municipalities in South Africa during the 2019 South African elections. He argues that while riots and electoral violence were prevalent in five of the eight metropolitan cities in South Africa, like Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg and Tshwane, they did not impact the overall voter turnout of the metros compared to other municipalities. Instead, that pre-election riots may have affected the overall voter turnout of other municipalities like the districts and local municipalities, which had lower voter turnout compared to the overall turnout of the metros. This paper highlights the repercussions of the urban-rural divide in understanding voting turnout and how citizens time protest actions and how the impact of the impact of these is felt differently based on geographics.

Mmabatho Mongae, looks into the influence of service delivery protest on voter turnout during the 2019 general elections in South Africa’s urban hot-spots areas for service delivery protests, especially the townships surrounding the City of Cape Town in Khayelitsha, Nomzamo, Caledon and Eerster River in the Western Cape; in Johannesburg in Alexandra, Orange Groove and Soweto; and in Tshwane in Hammanskraal, Soshanguve, Mabopane and Winter veldt in Gauteng. Unlike Desia, Mongae’s paper argues that services delivery protests in the urban areas were accompanied by a decline in voter turnout compared to the previous election years, where, for instance, the overall voter turnout for for National Assembly in Gauteng in 2019 was 8.58% and Western Cape was 68.18%. While in 2014 the voter turnout for the National Assembly in Gauteng was 76.5% and 74.4% for Western Cape. In addition, the voter turnout for Provincial Legislature in 2019 was 68.28% for Gauteng and 66.28% for the Western Cape. And in 2014 the voter turnout for the same election of the Provincial Legislature was 72.79% for Gauteng and 72.76% for the Western Cape.

Yasmin Sizwe compares gender representation during the 2019 elections in South Africa and Mozambique. Her paper argues that, while, gender representation remains an important goal for countries in the Southern Africa region with women constituting over 50% of the national population in South Africa and Mozambique. However, women remain underrepresented in electoral processes either as candidates of political parties or as administrators of elections. The paper finds that while both countries employed more women than men as election administrators, in South Africa 78.2%
elections staff were women while in Mozambique 51% of the election staff were women. It also, find that Mozambique had a lower number of women who were deployed by political parties at local level as party agents which was at 25%, while South Africa had 59.7% women party agents. She argues that there has to be more inclusion of women in electoral processes at local level, in order to attract more women to participate in electoral processes. And lastly she argues that women are excluded from political processes in rural than urban areas in Mozambique because of the lack of education and empowerment of women in rural areas.

Elly Ngoma explores the relationship between xenophobia and voter turnout. The paper finds that xenophobic violence and elections are related and that the relationship between the two concepts is complex because the violence is also related to socio-economic and historical factors in South Africa. The paper points out that the experiences of xenophobia can either motivate or discourage voter turnout.

Joshua Nel explores the relationship between the dominance of the ruling party and violent civil demonstrations in South Africa. Nel found a negative relationship or no relationship between support of the African National Congress and the violent civil demonstration. He argues that municipalities that are governed by the ANC tend to have less incidents of violent civil demonstration. While pointing out that some municipalities controlled by the ANC such as eThekwini, City of Cape Town, City of Tshwane and Msunduzi had high number of violent civil demonstrations, but the ANC maintained its popular support from these municipalities. He argues that services delivery protests in the highly populated municipalities tend to incorporate high incidents of violence and unrest that than less populated areas, because urban area have more people who live in deprivation, unemployed, and don’t have houses.
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Rioting and voter turnout: A look at South Africa’s 2019 elections

Pranish Desai

Introduction

In May 2019, South Africa held its sixth democratic general elections, which were considered by the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa’s (EISA’s) observer mission as “well organised and largely peaceful on voting day itself” (EISA, 2019). This observation on voting day, however, contrasted somewhat with the prevalence of politically motivated riots leading up to and following the elections. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a riot is a “violent demonstration, often involving a spontaneous action by unorganized, unaffiliated members of society” (ACLED, 2019). Common features of these riots include “mob violence” and the destruction of public and private property (ACLED, 2019).

As South Africa recorded its lowest voter turnout of any general election in 2019, there was much debate around whether this was caused by the riots (Bekoe and Burchard, 2017; Shenga and Pereira, 2019). One argument was that, to reduce competition, politicians themselves were responsible for instigating violence (Bekoe and Burchard, 2017). Another view was that the violence would have actually increased voter turnout rather than have the opposite effect (Shenga and Pereira, 2019). With these contrasting views in mind, this discussion will look at the relationship between the riots and voter turnout. This will be done in relation to evidence drawn from the 2019 general elections, which includes data from ACLED, which maps out where rioting took place, and data from the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that captured and mapped the rate of voter turnout.

Findings from EISA’s observer mission

EISA’s observers had a considerable presence throughout the 2019 elections. In the early stages of the campaign, observers attended campaign events in Eastern Cape, Free State, Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal. In the final week of the campaign, this was extended to all provinces, with observers present at select voting stations during the special voting period (6-7 May). Although the observers reported favourably on the special voting process, they noted that voters were generally unaware that the option of special voting existed (EISA, 2019).

On election day (8 May), EISA deployed observer teams to 295 voting stations across South Africa in a way that was nationally representative (EISA, 2019). Observer teams concluded that procedures on election day were well planned and that technical issues were largely absent. Observers also noted a high level of stability on election day, with only sporadic incidents of protests in KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Mpumalanga (ACLED, 2019).

Figure 1 shows the quality of the 2019 elections based on surveys completed by EISA’s observer teams on election day. The survey measured election quality on a scale of 0-10 in terms of technical quality, security quality, and integrity quality. The overall quality indicator is the average of the three measures. As high scores were recorded, it was inferred that the elections were of a high quality.
Overall, the election scored 9.6 out of 10, which bears testament to the IEC’s competence. However, as these elections saw democratic South Africa’s lowest voter turnout, the high overall quality of the electoral process cannot be extrapolated to conclude that electoral democracy is generally healthy in South Africa.

**Riots during South Africa’s election period**

Even though stability was reported on election day itself, the months preceding and following the elections were beset by politically motivated riots across the country. According to ACLED (2019), 350 politically related riots occurred in the period 8 February 2019 to 8 August 2019. The national rate of politically motivated riots during this period was around two riots per day. A political riot is one wherein the main actors have some links to political groups such as political parties, or where the primary issue at stake involves politics in some way, an example being service delivery protests. The majority of these 350 riots were violent service delivery protests, but there were also instances of “mob justice” involving political parties in some provinces (ACLED, 2019). Figure 2 shows the number of riots per million people in each municipal district over the six-month period.

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1 This period was chosen to locate election day, 8 May 2019, at the mid-point of the timeframe.
The map shows the four largest clusters of riots, occurring in parts of Free State, Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape. This finding correlates with the fact that these areas have high population densities. On average, there were 8.43 riots per million people in the Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg and Tshwane municipalities, far exceeding the average of 1.64 riots per million people across all municipalities. This interpretation is supported by the fact that sparsely populated provinces, such as Northern Cape and North West, recorded the fewest riots over the period. No riots occurred over the period in greyed-out municipalities.

**Voter turnout**

As previously mentioned, the 2019 elections had the lowest turnout of all democratic elections in South Africa. Of the registered population, only 66% voted, 7.48% lower than the 2014 elections (IEC, 2014; IEC, 2019). Although the number of registered voters increased by more than 1 million between 2014 and 2019, actual turnout, in absolute terms, decreased by a similar amount, from 18.65 million votes cast in 2014 to 17.67 million in 2019 (IEC, 2014; IEC, 2019). Figure 3 shows the percentage of voter turnout in each municipality.

![Voter Turnout (%) by Municipal District 2019 South African Elections](image)

As with riots (see Figure 2), there was higher voter turnout in densely populated municipalities. The five most populated municipalities – Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg and Tshwane – were among the 25 municipalities that recorded the highest turnout. At 71.63%, the average turnout in these five urban centres significantly exceeded the national turnout (66%). However, it should be noted that these are average voter turnout figures, and so, differences in turnout within these municipalities is not something encompassed by this brief. As with the location of riots, sparsely populated municipalities, such as those in Northern Cape and North West, on average saw lower turnout relative to the national average.

**Effects of riots on voter turnout**

Recently, some noteworthy – and contrasting – studies have been conducted that look at the effect of election violence on voter turnout in Africa (Bekoe and Burchard, 2017; Shenga and Pereira, 2019). Bekoe and Burchard (2017) argue that politicians can intentionally spark pre-election violence as a means to suppress turnout. However, their study found an inconclusive pattern in terms of whether the incitement of violence translates into a decrease in voter turnout (Bekoe and Burchard, 2017). By contrast, Shenga and Pereira (2019) found that election-related violence
might actually encourage voter participation. They argue that the greater the perception of election violence among citizens, the greater the likelihood that citizens participate in the electoral process by attending political events such as rallies and voting on election day (Shenga and Pereira, 2019). This discussion resonates with Shenga and Pereira’s findings in that, as has been noted in this analysis, there was a higher frequency of riots in densely populated areas (see Figure 2), while there was also a higher average voter turnout in these areas (see Figure 3). While a more disaggregated study might show some high-density areas with low turnout but also frequent rioting, and some high-density areas with high turnout but minimal rioting, this municipal-level analysis suggests that on balance, high density areas are more prone to both higher voter turnout, and the more frequent occurrence of political riots.

In contrast, municipalities that had no riots tended to have lower average voter turnout, and these municipalities are usually located in rural areas. The voter national turnout of 66% exceeded the average turnout for municipalities that had no election-related violence (63.18%) over the six-month period. While this is not a great difference, this finding might hint that voters in rural areas are of the view that any political action they take – whether through voting or protest – is less likely to elicit a response from elected representatives and political parties, a substantial concern within the overall context of South African democracy.

Although the method of analysis used in this discussion was not statistically advanced, it was adequate to look at the relationship between riots and voter turnout in South Africa. However, it would be useful for future research to delve into the strength of this relationship by controlling for other factors.

**Conclusion**

The objective of this discussion was to analyse the extent to which riots may have an effect on voter turnout in South Africa. In so doing, this discussion shed some light on the issue, where views on the effects of “politically motivated” riots on voter turnout are polarised. This is especially pertinent given that although the 2019 general election process was noted for the technical competence shown by the IEC, the fact that South Africa recorded the lowest national election voter turnout of its democratic history demonstrates that technical proficiency alone is not sufficient for ensuring a healthy democracy.

By drawing on municipal-level data (IEC, 2019) and that pertaining specifically to riots (ACLED, 2019), findings suggested that the prevalence of riots, particularly in large urban centres, was associated with higher rates of voter turnout relative to areas with low or no occurrence of riots. On average, municipalities that experienced high levels of electoral violence – such as Cape Town, Ekurhuleni, eThekwini, Johannesburg and Tshwane – also experienced higher voter turnout than the national rate. Regions that saw fewer election riots were generally rural municipalities that also saw lower turnout relative to the national percentage. These findings should be subjected to further inquiry, including a more comprehensive disaggregated analysis which also controls for other related factors in more formal statistical tests to discern whether a meaningful relationship exists between riots and voter turnout.
References


Protest action as a form of political expression in South Africa: The influence of service delivery protests on voter turnout

Mmabatho Mongae

Introduction

Although South Africa has made great strides since the fall of apartheid, challenges such as inequality, high unemployment and the lack of basic services remain (Lehohla, 2017). As such, achieving equality is one of South Africa’s main development goals, as, over time, this would impact voter behaviour and determine the overall quality and sustainability of democracy in the country (Endoh 2015). Although mass participation in elections is not the only factor that contributes to a healthy democracy, it plays a central role in its consolidation and sustainability (Schedler 2001, 71; Ajambo 2007, 70).

South Africa has had six national elections since its transition to democracy. Over the years, there has been a significant decline in voter turnout, which is an obvious indication of a shift in citizens' political behaviour. This leads to questions around the reasons for this decline, as well as why voter turnout differs geographically. A key question for purposes of this discussion is, therefore: Why is voter turnout higher (or lower) in some areas?

A number of studies have linked voter turnout to socioeconomic conditions (Martikainen et al. 2005; Blackley et al. 2001). It has also been argued that the lack of access to basic public services lead to service delivery protests (Sartorius and Sartorius, 2016). Related to this is another observation that while there has been a steady decline in voter turnout in impoverished areas, service delivery protests have increased in these areas since the 1999 elections. In responding to our key question, this discussion explores the link between voter turnout and poor service delivery.

Data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) will be used to measure the extent to which service delivery protests (as a proxy of poor service delivery) affects voter turnout. ACLED data comprises newspaper reports on service delivery protests that occurred in South Africa between 1 May 2018 and 31 May 2019. Voter turnout data from EISA and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) will be used to assess provincial and municipal voter turnout trends.

Service delivery protests

Since 1994, the ANC has managed to win the majority of votes during elections. Concurrently, we’ve seen a yearly spike in the number of service delivery protests across South Africa. Unsurprisingly, these protests tend to increase around elections. For example, in 2008, 27 protests were reported; while in 2009, the year of the fourth national elections, this number increased to 107 (Heese, 2019). Similarly, 155 service delivery protests were reported in 2013; while 191 were reported in 2014. It’s important to note, however, that protests still occur in years when there are no elections. The vast majority of service delivery protests take place in areas that are highly politically contested, such as Gauteng and Western Cape. This raises the question of whether these protests are politically driven (Sadie et al, 2016). Of the 48 political parties contesting in the 2019 national elections, 36 contested in Gauteng and 34 in the Western Cape (IEC 2019). These provinces also have the most service delivery protests. In the year leading up to the 2019 elections, 1395 service delivery protests were reported by various newspapers across South Africa. Of these, 226 took place in Cape Town, 155 in Johannesburg and 116 in Tshwane.
On the micro level, all three of these municipalities had the highest numbers of reported service delivery protests in their central business districts (76 in Cape Town, 46 in Johannesburg and 65 in Pretoria). This is unsurprising as seats of national, provincial and local government are mainly located in these cities. This correlation suggests that citizens protest where power resides. Data also indicate that most service delivery protests took place in impoverished areas such as Khayelitsha (22), Mitchells Plain (8), Mamelodi (9) and Alexandra (7). It is worth noting that a noticeable number of service delivery protests took place in Midrand (10) and Soweto (9), which are melting pots of social and economic classes.

**Voter turnout trends**

Elections are seen to be a bridge between politicians and citizens (Berganza, 1998). If this is true, a continuous decline in voter turnout suggests that there is a disconnect between the two. Individuals choosing not to vote could indicate disinterest, but also dissatisfaction with the political party they’ve previously supported (Schulz-Herzenberg, 2009).

In 2019, the IEC recorded the highest number of registered voters since 1994. By province, Gauteng had the highest number of registered voters (6.3 million), followed by KwaZulu-Natal (5.5 million), with Northern Cape having the least (600,000). Of Gauteng’s registered voters, 4.3 million cast their ballots on election day, equating to a voter turnout of 68.28%. This represents a significant decrease when compared with the 89.16% turnout in 1999. More specifically, in 2019, the City of Johannesburg recorded a voter turnout of 70.81%, the City of Cape Town 69.86% and the City of Tshwane 72.2% (IEC 2019).
Although this is a decline from the previous elections, the voter turnout is relatively healthy in comparison to municipalities such as Buffalo City and eThekwini. eThekwini and Buffalo City recorded relatively high service delivery protests – 179 and 44 respectively. However, data from EISA indicates that in comparison to other municipalities they recorded a lower voter turnout – 31% and 56.62% respectively.

A more nuanced picture of the distribution of voter turnout across South Africa in 2019 national elections is shown in Figure 2.

![Figure 2: Distribution of voter turnout across South Africa in the 2019 national elections](image)

At the various polling stations visited by EISA observers, not only was the total number of registered voters low, but the total number of people who voted was even lower. For example, data from EISA indicates that district municipalities such as Mangaung (26.4%), Bojolana (27.23%), King Williams (27.51%) and Emfuleni (27.80%) recorded very low voter turnout - this is in line with the general low voter turnout across all districts and municipalities.

**Linking service delivery protests to voter turnout**

Based on the trends noted in the previous sections, we can observe that service delivery protests tend to spike during election periods and that the increase in service delivery protests has increased simultaneously to a steady decrease in voter turnout. In addition, the available information shows a decline in voter turnout at the local level in all three municipalities or districts (Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane) that have experienced high levels of service delivery protests. Additionally, the data presented here suggest an association between poverty and both the
incidence of service delivery protests and turn out; service delivery protests and the number of registered voters who chose not to vote are both higher in poorer areas (see Figure 2).

Worth noting, however, is that there are areas – such as Emfuleni (Gauteng), Knysna (Western Cape), Mpofana (KwaZulu-Natal) and Saldana Bay (Western Cape) – that had relatively few service delivery protests recorded voter turnouts of above 70%. More specifically, out of all the municipalities, Lekwa (Mpumalanga) had the highest voter turnout (80%) and registered just four service delivery protests.

These findings are consistent with the socio-economic conditions that characterise these municipalities. Except for eThekwini, the central metros - the City of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane – show a consistent trend. These metros are South Africa’s economic and power hubs and are highly polarised – not all areas in these metros are faced with the same service delivery challenges, thus there are going to be people who vote and others who choose protest action as a form of political expression.

The general decline in voter turnout is suggestive of voter fatigue among South Africans, especially those living in poor areas. This means that the political terrain is no longer inspiring confidence in those who are deprived of basic services, thus making protest action a means of political expression. This finding is aligned with the global voter fatigue trend. For example, the United States recorded a voter turnout of just 56% in its 2016 presidential election (Desilver, 2018). Countries that record high voter turnouts are, unsurprisingly, those who enforce compulsory voting, such as Belgium and Australia (Santiago 2015).

Conclusion

The aim of this discussion was to explore how service delivery protests influence voter turnout. Voter turnout and service delivery trends and patterns indicate that there are three patterns that emerge: Firstly, the general decline in voter turnout was linked with an increase in service delivery protests. Secondly, in smaller municipalities lower reports of service delivery protests were linked with higher voter turnout. Lastly, most service delivery protests occurred in the three central and highly contested areas in South Africa – the City of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane.

A closer look into the latter suggest that is a tendency for service delivery protests to occur not only in highly politically contested areas, but in poor areas and in central business districts. These protests tend to increase during election periods, with the top three hotspots for service delivery protests during the 2019 election period the cities of Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane. It was also observed that lower voter turnout is recorded in areas where there are more service delivery protests, again, Cape Town, Johannesburg and Tshwane. This suggests that people who live in areas that are less affected by service delivery issues are more likely to vote than those living in areas where there are more service delivery challenges. In these areas, protest action may be regarded as an alternative to voting. As a result, service delivery protests are increasingly becoming the norm as a means of political expression. This trend is one that cannot be overlooked as it speaks to the health and sustainability of democracy in South Africa.

It also indicates that politicians are perhaps not understanding and engaging with the majority of citizens. More often than not, if service delivery in less affluent areas continues to be overlooked, confidence in municipalities, incumbents and in elections more generally will continue to wane and disgruntled citizens will continue to opt for alternatives to voting. Low voter turnout is also perhaps a reflection of how South Africans are choosing to engage in the democratic process.

Analysis from South Africa’s 2021 local elections will play a vital role in providing further insights as to whether voting trends in 2021 will mirror those of 2019. An analysis of voter turnout in the 2021 local elections in less affluent areas compared with more affluent areas will expand on the current findings.
References


Small but significant: A descriptive analysis of women's participation in electoral administration and low-level politics

Yasmin Sizwe

Introduction

The participation of women in electoral administration is of great importance for democratic processes, especially in terms of creating gender equity where it would not be possible otherwise (UN, 2005). As gatekeepers of democracy, political parties can also pave the way for women's involvement in politics, either as candidates or party agents.

Women can participate in electoral processes on 3 levels: political, which includes voters, activists and candidates; administratively; and as election observers (UN, 2005). Including women at all levels can enhance the overall election process by bringing meaningful perspectives and contributing to the legitimacy of elections and other democratic institutions, especially in transitional societies (ibid). In short, equal gender representation is crucial to sustaining democracy.

Women represent a part of society that has been overlooked for decades. “Today, women cast ballots in equal, or even greater, numbers than men. Yet women continue to lag behind men as party members and campaign activists. This situation persists despite the fact that equal rights for women, including rights to citizenship and suffrage, are guaranteed in the constitutions of all modern democracies.” (OSCE et al. 2014)

In spite of the obstacles faced by women, their representation in electoral processes is slowly advancing in South Africa and Mozambique, which have sought to ensure that women contribute to their political and electoral agendas. These countries are increasingly integrating women in an effort to ensure that democratic processes are at work. Yet, despite remarkable progress, there are some noticeable disparities between the two countries.

This discussion seeks to analyse the level of women's participation in South Africa and Mozambique’s respective 2019 electoral processes, taking into account specific areas of residence (urban and rural). Given that women can participate at various levels of the electoral process, this discussion will focus on participation in administration (as polling staff) and low-level politics (as party agents).

In doing so, observational data from EISA, which were gathered during the 2019 elections in both countries, will be used. This discussion aims to set the stage for other studies into how increases in women's participation could be beneficial to reducing election fraud and violence.

Women's integration into democratic processes in South Africa and Mozambique

South Africa

During its transition to democracy, social and political actors in South Africa conducted various negotiations to ensure that new democratic institutions were representative of all people. This idea had been implemented in 1991 with Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) (Britton, 2002). While building a more inclusive society was of utmost importance for a newly constituted democracy, calls for gender equality was all but absent at the time, with the unique challenges faced by women during apartheid having been sidelined.
In response, the Women’s National Coalition was formed in 1992, which intended to introduce gender equality to the conversation and call for women’s representation and participation in political institutions. This was done through drafting the Women's Charter for Effective Equity, which consolidated women’s presence in democracy and sparked reforms in the electoral institution (Goetz, 1998; Gouws, 2004). The charter also served as a catalyst for the ANC to commit to a 30% quota for the representation of women at all levels of government since 1994, which in turn contributed to the overall increased political participation of women since South Africa’s transition (EISA, 2009).

By 1999, five years after the country’s first democratic election, women’s participation had increased to 29% (Pitamber, 2015). Initiatives that were put in place to ensure women’s participation in politics and elections are still considered today. This upward trajectory has continued, as South African women now contribute at almost equal levels as men in elections and politics (ibid). As such, women's participation in political structures are more clearly visible and their contribution to the overall functioning of South African democratic processes are more evident.

Mozambique

As a preamble to its transition, Mozambique had implemented a programme called Educação Cívica (“civic education”) (Jacobson, 1995). The programme’s main goal was to inform the public on the importance of democracy and human rights through a variety of initiatives that covered topics such as voter rights and the legitimacy of elections in a democracy (Jacobson, 1995). Women’s organisations such as Organização da Mulher Moçambicana and other community groups were integral in the civic education agenda. They assisted in laying the foundations for women to participate in the election process and emphasised the significance of women’s perspectives in the country’s political landscape (Glen, 2004). These efforts were introduced to ensure that women voters were well informed on the importance of their contribution to Mozambique’s future democracy.

According to Karberg (2015), signing agreements such as the SADC Protocol for Gender and Development in 2005 led Mozambique to make policy adjustments to ensure women’s representation in the country’s legal landscape. “Since then, gender equality has become more prominent, and women’s political representation in Mozambique has progressively improved.” Accordingly, women’s political representation increased from 16% in 1991 to 31% in 2001, then to 39.6% in 2009 (Karberg, 2015).

However, despite these improvements, men continue to dominate the political and electoral landscape (Gender Links, 2019). The impact of civic education in the 1990s was not seen as effective as it often followed a format with complex terminology, thereby excluding large portions of the population (Jacobson, 2010). To date, especially in rural areas, elections and politics are not well understood. As argued by Nyamuzuwe (2020), Mozambican women are struggling to actively participate in elections due to a lack of voter education programmes, which have led women to devalue elections and their contributions. Despite these challenges, visible efforts have been made to include women in the country’s development agenda.

Data analysis

South Africa and Mozambique have made considerable efforts to increase women's participation in their electoral processes since their transitions to democracy. As each country has its own sets of challenges, the following sections take into consideration how their experiences have differed.
While the integration of women into electoral administration and low-level politics seems to have advanced significantly in South Africa, progress in Mozambique has been slow but steady. Figure 1 shows the proportion of women’s participation in elections at an administrative level (as polling staff) and in low-level politics (as party agents), in South Africa and Mozambique. It should be noted that observers have been excluded from the analysis as they do not participate in the proceedings of elections.

A nuanced story can be told based on this data, which generally show that women have been included in the 2019 electoral processes in South Africa and Mozambique. In South Africa, there were a total of 2202 polling staff countrywide, of which 78.2% were women. When we look at areas of residence (urban and rural), a few differences are found. Women employed as polling staff in rural areas accounted for 69% of the total people employed there, while in urban areas they accounted for 80%. This suggests that women’s access to formal employment as polling staff members was higher in urban areas than in the rural areas. With regards to party agents, there were 1684 workers in South Africa, of which 59.7% were women. This suggests that the inclusion of women in low-level politics is not as great as the inclusion of women in administrative work. But when comparing the areas of residence, we see more women in rural areas involved in politics as party agents (62%) than those in urban areas (58%).
Unlike South Africa, Mozambique’s data tell us a slightly different story. For its 2019 elections, the country employed 1590 polling staff, of which 51% were women. Looking at the areas of residence, we found that the percentage of women employed as polling staff (48%) is less than that of men (52%), while in urban areas the percentage of women (55%) is higher than that of men (45%). It appears, then, that administrative work for women is greater in urban areas than in rural areas. With regards to party agents, Mozambique employed 612 personnel, of which only 26% were women. This suggests that women are weakly involved in the country’s low-level politics. This weak involvement is slightly greater in rural areas, with only 25% of party agents being women. The figure is slightly higher in urban areas, at 34%. This observation mirrors the observations of Jacobson (2010) and Nyamuzuwe (2020), who point out that women in Mozambique, especially in rural areas, are generally excluded from the political processes.

Comparative analysis

Based on these findings, a general observation is that, compared with Mozambique, South Africa has more women than men employed either as polling staff or party agents, irrespective of areas of residence. This suggests that South Africa is relatively more progressive than Mozambique when it comes to gender inclusivity in electoral processes. As observed, generally, while in South Africa the majority of women employed were from urban areas, the opposite is true in Mozambique. It could be argued that this is due to population distribution, as data from the UNDP (2020) suggests that 68% of Mozambique’s population resides in rural areas, compared with South Africa’s 36%.

The view held in this discussion is that these differences could be attributed more generally to the dissimilar participation of women in politics in the two countries. As previously mentioned, the history of how women were integrated into politics and elections could be a contributing factor to the differences seen in our analysis. South Africa had an arguably more successful integration of women from the onset, which might have contributed to their increasing participation in each election year. Unlike South Africa, Mozambique experienced some setbacks, such as not being able to effectively educate women from rural areas. This has perhaps resulted in limited involvement and participation of women in the country’s politics generally, and in their contribution to elections more specifically.

Regardless of the differences between the two countries, both have had women participating in electoral processes at the administrative level and in low-level politics. However, additional efforts are yet to be made to include more women in the countries’ political landscapes, especially in Mozambique, where this process has been relatively slow.

Conclusion

This discussion sought to analyse the level of women’s participation in the 2019 election processes in South Africa and Mozambique as polling staff members and party agents. These countries have a shared history of being newly constituted democracies, both having their first multiparty elections in 1994. But the way these democracies have moved towards creating gender equality have differed significantly. Despite the fact that these two countries have considered the participation of women, South Africa appears to have made more progress. This difference is noticeable when analysing the participation of women in low-level politics, with South Africa having 59.7% women employed as party agents, with Mozambique having just 26%.

Understanding what sustains these differences is the way forward. Women’s participation in democratic processes is often assumed to improve the quality of democratic institutions, as more inclusive institutional environments can lead to the reduction of election fraud and violence. Therefore, studying female participation and how they can potentially contribute to more transparent and safe elections should be explored further.
References


Ballots and scapegoats: Understanding the relationship between xenophobia and voter turnout

Elly Ngoma

Introduction

The xenophobic violence that swept through South Africa in May 2008 produced a new South African identity within the global imagination, one that portrays its citizens as human rights violators, the very antithesis of the “peace-loving rainbow nation” that Nelson Mandela had carved out after apartheid. There has been much discussion about the source of these xenophobic outbursts, with some arguing that it’s the result of a socioeconomic crisis, most notably caused by inequality, poor service delivery and disenfranchisement (Joubert, 2008).

Regardless, xenophobic violence in South Africa appears to flare up before and during elections (Davis, 2019; Fröhlich and Lopez-Granados, 2019), which might signal an association between these two phenomena. This discussion investigates this possible relationship by looking specifically at how xenophobic violence affects voter turnout in densely populated urban townships. Our discussion is limited to townships in Gauteng, as the province has the highest prevalence of xenophobic violence in South Africa (Clionadh et al. 2010).

Historical context

Communal violence is not a new or recent phenomenon in South African townships. During apartheid, townships were the sites of much unrest, including state-sponsored and gang-related forms of violence (Kynoch, 2008). This was exacerbated by the brutal mining economy and by the racism of the time, which worked together to set up townships as incubators for violence. This violence has now become a cultural component of township life and has created a generational legacy of violence (ibid). It is, therefore, unsurprising that there are high levels of xenophobic violence in the townships considered in this discussion.

The fact that intimidation, rape, murder and looting, among other crimes, were rife in townships during apartheid, and remain rife in townships today, might indicate that these environments are susceptible to xenophobic violence. It is crucial to note that South Africans are also harmed during xenophobic attacks, indicating that a politics of othering is at play, where anyone who is deemed different is a potential victim (Ochieng, 2017). Additionally, that this form of violence appears to increase before and during elections is not a new observation (Davis, 2019; Fröhlich and Lopez-Granados, 2019).
The graph shows the distribution of xenophobic violence from 2008 to 2019, and that spikes in 2015 and 2019 occurred during or before elections. Some have linked these flare-ups to political parties, which often use anti-immigrant rhetoric during election campaigns to secure votes (Davis, 2019). Others argue that there is a more sinister game at play, where local groups and community associations act as instigating agents, sparking outbursts to advance their own economic and political agendas (Misago, 2019).

**Xenophobic violence in theory**

It is important to establish a theoretical understanding of xenophobic violence in South Africa, as this will help us make sense of the socio-political ramifications of our findings. A good point of departure is Appadurai’s (2006) theory about the fear of small numbers and communal violence. It is argued that the way xenophobic violence manifests in South Africa is cyclical in nature and can be likened to a “purging” that occurs at regular intervals. This “purging” is premised upon the need to separate one’s self from the “other” – a separation of South African majorities from “foreign”, or “other”, minorities.

The idea of majorities and minorities as markers of difference is understood to have risen with the modern nation-state (Appadurai, 2006). This is because modern national sovereignty requires, as Appadurai (2006) puts it, “some sort of ethnic genius” ideology to mobilise the masses into believing that they possess a collective identity worth protecting from invaders. Globalisation and increased migration flows threaten this notion because they blur the lines between “us and them”. They do so because, as people travel, their national identities, which were previously seen as monolithic, have become transnational, intersecting multiple nationalities, making it difficult to distinguish the collective “us” from the collective “them” (Hall, 1997).

Although these types of collective identities can create an inclusive sense of community, as well as idealism and tolerance in certain circumstances, they can also generate exclusion, fanaticism, violence and xenophobia (Griffin, 2015). Xenophobic violence then becomes an effective way to differentiate the “us” from the “them” through stereotyping and scapegoating, thereby protecting the “ethnic genius” upon which national identities are premised (Appadurai, 2006).

When xenophobic people call for the deportation of migrants for “stealing our jobs”, “dealing drugs” and “taking our women”, they invoke ideas of a distinction between the invisible “us” and “them”. Historically, this distinction has created predatory identities, which tend to demand the extinction of other identities that threaten their existence and the communal “we”.

As such, benign social identities become predatory by mobilising an understanding of the self as being a threatened majority. This threatened majority then requires the extinction of other minority collectives for its own survival (Appadurai, 2006). For this reason, as Appadurai observes, predatory groups use pseudo-demographic arguments such as job losses or crowded hospitals to justify their hostile treatment of their minority enemies. Hence the “fear of small numbers” is a necessary condition for communal violence.

At this point, and in line with Appadurai’s theory, it is important to be clear about what we mean when we use the term “xenophobic violence”. For purposes of this discussion, xenophobic violence can be defined as any type of violence enacted on a person based on their status as a “foreigner”. It is a violence that manifests as a result of a fear or hatred of the other person based on the individual possessing a different ethnic, national or racial background (Xenowatch, 2020). This violence manifests in various ways, including but not limited to, intimidation, rape, murder, looting, arson, necklacing and vandalism.
Data analysis

Next we move to voter turnout, which is calculated by dividing the number of people who voted by the number of people who registered to vote in a given area (Bartlett, 2019). Voter turnout data were gathered from EISA's studies on South Africa's 2019 elections and population data were obtained from Census 2011. Data concerning xenophobic violence were collected from two sources, the ACLED dataset (Clionadh et al. 2010) and Xenowatch (Xenowatch, 2020). Both datasets focus on recording and tracking the ways in which xenophobic threats and violence have manifested in South Africa over the past decade.

Data used for purposes of this discussion focus on 17 townships in four municipalities in Gauteng: Ivory Park, Alexandra, Lenasia, Diepsloot, Zandspruit, Orange Farm, Lawley, Kanana Park, Soweto, Tembisa, Katlehong, Mamelodi, Tsakane, Sebokeng, Daveyton, Vosloorus and Etwatwa (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Distribution of xenophobic outbursts per million population in townships across Gauteng
Populations in these areas range from 21,005 to 1,272,000 (Frith, 2020).

Figure 3: Population per township, according to Census 2011

We scale our xenophobic violence measure as xenophobic violent events per million of the population. This ensures that we do not prematurely misdiagnose areas with high populations, such as Soweto, as being more violent than other townships. Logically, urban areas that are densely populated would have a higher prevalence of xenophobic violence compared with areas that have smaller populations, as they are more likely to have more migrants. But a small number of cases do not conform with this general observation, as seen in Alexandra and Ivory Park, which have similar populations but experienced different levels of xenophobic violence (see Figure 2 and Figure 3).

How do areas with a high prevalence of xenophobic violence differ from areas with a low prevalence when it comes to voter turnout? Data analysis suggests that townships with low levels of xenophobic violence tend to have a slightly higher voter turnout of 0.65%, on average, than townships with high levels of xenophobic violence. This observation corroborates López García and Maydom’s (2009) finding that high crime rates often correlate with lower voter turnout, as illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5.

Figure 4: Voter turnout in relation to levels of xenophobic violence bar graph
That voter turnout appears to be slightly higher in areas with low levels of xenophobic violence is perhaps due to perceptions of safety. Increased xenophobic violence in an area creates the perception that the area is not safe. Since data suggest that violence increases before and during elections (see Figure 1), people might not vote in areas with a high prevalence of xenophobic violence due to fear for their safety.

![Figure 5: Voter turnout in relation to levels of xenophobic violence scatterplot](image)

An important observation, however, is that 3 out of 18 locations from our sample (Daveyton, Tembisa and Soweto) present different patterns when compared with other cases. These townships had the highest voter turnout but experienced varying levels of xenophobic violence, ranging from low (Daveyton), moderate (Tembisa) to high (Soweto), the latter being the most extreme case. But even when taking these deviations into account, voter turnout appears to still be slightly higher, on average, in areas with low levels of xenophobic violence.

Rather than challenging the general assumption that xenophobic violence affects participation in elections, these three cases are an indication of the complexity surrounding elections studies, and indicate the need for a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between xenophobic violence and voter turnout. The findings presented in this discussion are limited due to the narrow geographical scope. Broadening the sample size and controlling for other factors might shed light on the reasons behind areas such as Soweto being outliers.

**Conclusion**

This discussion aimed to investigate the extent to which xenophobic violence affects voter turnout in densely populated urban townships. Findings suggest that there is often a higher prevalence of xenophobic violence before and during elections, which indicates a relationship between xenophobic violence and elections. Townships with lower levels of xenophobic violence often have a slightly higher level of voter turnout.

The source of this violence is arguably related to socio-political economic and historic factors. Based on the findings in this discussion, coupled with the fact that voter turnout has consistently decreased since the 1994 national elections (Jankie, 2019), democracy in South Africa is likely to be improved by to quelling xenophobic violence.
References


Exploring the relationship between governing-party dominance and violent civil demonstrations in South Africa

Joshua Nel

Introduction

Violent civil demonstrations have been on the rise in South Africa, with Gauteng having a prevalent number of protests than other provinces. These events are often believed to be the result of citizens’ dissatisfaction with the government’s ability to deliver basic services. It should therefore not be surprising to see the concurrent trends of more frequent violent demonstrations and increased voter dissatisfaction and political disengagement, particularly among the youth (EISA, 2019).

Studies suggest that when people are dissatisfied with democracy in their country and are disengaged from the traditional channels of political participation (Abdelzadeh and Ekman, 2012), violent civil demonstrations might offer a means to advance their political agendas (Runciman, 2016). Some studies have linked forms of civil protest to regime types, either democratic or autocratic (Ulfelder, 2000; Scarritt et al. 2001). Others have linked social movements to elections (McAdam and Tarrow, 2010) and population density, whereby areas with larger populations experience more violence than less populated areas (Clioradh and Herge, 2009).

Although these studies have offered ideas for understanding some of the causes of violent civil demonstrations, only a few have explored how political struggles might give rise to violent demonstrations (Ulfelder, 2000; Morudu, 2017). The impact of intra- and inter-party dynamics on peace remains widely unexplored (Ahare, 2018). As such, the idea that violence is more prevalent in regions dominated by dominant governing parties is largely overlooked.

The following discussion aims to explore this idea by analysing the extent to which governing-party dominance is associated with incidents of violent civil demonstrations in South Africa, a country whose governance has largely been dominated by the ANC since 1994. For purposes of this discussion, population size is considered a confounding variable that informs our analysis.

Concepts and measurement

We define violent civil demonstrations as events where civilians engage in demonstrations with recorded violence against people and the destruction or damage of property (Raleigh and Dowd, 2015). No distinction is drawn between violent civil demonstrations and service delivery protests, as there is insufficient available information in our data to meaningfully differentiate between the two. We use data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) project to provide the number of incidents that occurred in each municipality (2018-2019) over the study period. An advantage of using this dataset is its inclusion of violent events that do not necessarily result in significant casualties or fatalities (Eck, 2012).

Of relevance to this discussion is the concept of “governing-party dominance”, which can be described in terms of the nature of dominance, that is, either “absolute dominance” or “relative dominance”. While absolute dominance refers to a party’s share of seats in the national legislature, relative dominance refers to a party’s dominance relative to the strength of its opposition (Vampa, 2020). In this analysis, governing-party dominance refers to the ANC’s share of the popular vote at the municipal level. As such, areas with large ANC support are considered to have governing-party dominance, which is measured using ANC vote share in the official Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) municipal polling results.
Municipal-level population data have been obtained from Stats SA. However, due to significant variations in the size of populations per municipality, a logarithmic transformation is used for purposes of this discussion.

Data distribution across municipalities in South Africa

We visualize the key variables in this analysis in the maps in Figure 1. The map on the left combines the ANC’s share of votes at the municipal level (governing-party dominance) and the number of incidents recorded in each municipality (violent civil demonstrations), depicted as red dots. The map on the right combines the number of incidents recorded in each municipality with the population size of each municipality. This allows for the observation of trends prior to testing the effects of one variable on the other.

Figure 1: Maps of ANC vote share, population and violent civil demonstrations at the municipal level

In both maps, we can see that the municipalities with the most violent civil demonstrations were City of Cape Town (34 incidents), eThekwini (57 incidents), City of Johannesburg (50 incidents), City of Tshwane (19 incidents), and Msunduzi (13 incidents). The map on the left shows that in the five municipalities where the ANC recorded its largest share of the popular vote, only Makhado recorded incidents of violent civil demonstrations (5 incidents). The map on the right shows that more incidents occur in Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape. Incidents in these areas appear to cluster around major urban areas with higher levels of economic activity.

Our general, preliminary observations thus far suggest that while governing-party dominance does not seem to be associated with violent civil demonstrations, the latter appears to rather be associated with population size. However, these observations are only based on looking at the frequency of incidents. In the following section, we test the effects of our explanatory variables by using a regression model.

Effects of governing-party dominance on violent civil demonstrations

In Table 1, we report the results of regression models analysing the association between demonstrations on our explanatory variables. The first model tests the effect of governing-party dominance on violent civil demonstrations. We then test the effects of population size on violent civil demonstrations. Finally, we test the effect of governing-party dominance on violent civil demonstrations, while controlling for the effect of population size at the municipal level.
Table 1: Correlation between governing party dominance and violent civil demonstrations

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<tr>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
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<td>(0.83)</td>
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<td>(0.62)</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Note: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

The ANC’s share of votes at the municipal level did not have a statistically significant effect on the number of violent civil demonstrations. However, by testing the effects of population size on violent civil demonstrations alone, a positive and statistically significant association is found. Unsurprisingly, the same results are observed even when population is included in the model as a control variable. There is no evidence suggesting that areas with higher levels of governing-party dominance experience more incidents of violent civil demonstrations.

Even though testing the effect of population on violent civil demonstrations was not the primary objective of this work, a significant relationship between the two has been found, which creates room for further considerations on the matter. The results from this analysis resemble our preliminary observations, i.e. that violent civil demonstrations tend to take place in the country’s most populous areas. This finding echo that of Clionadh and Hergé (2009), which finds that regions with larger populations are more likely to experience incidents of violence and unrest than less densely populated areas.

Conclusion

This paper looked at the effects of governing-party dominance at the municipal level on violent civil demonstrations. The findings suggest a non-significant association, as the ANC’s share of the popular vote did not produce a statistically significant effect on violent civil demonstrations in our models. Instead, our results suggest that population size is a better predictor of violent civil demonstrations. This, in turn, suggests that future research might shed light on the issue if the effects of population on violent civil demonstrations are tested. This should be done while
controlling for relevant socioeconomic factors such as relative deprivation, unemployment and rapid settlement growth.

In future research, caution should be exercised when using the ACLED dataset. Firstly, the dataset does not allow for a distinction to be drawn between service delivery protests and violent civil demonstrations. Secondly, the dataset’s reliance on media reports may skew the number of observations towards populous regions where the media is more present. As pointed out by Demerest and Langer (2018), this requires researchers to be cognizant of the limitations of the data to avoid bias.

Also worth considering are the methodological limitations of our analysis, which point to a number of avenues for future study. Given the highly localised nature of violent incidents, studies undertaken at the ward or district levels could yield more nuanced results that better explain the high prevalence of violent civil demonstrations in South Africa.
References


