REPORT ON EISA'S
13TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM

REALISING DEMOCRATIC GAINS
THROUGH SOCIAL COHESION
IN AFRICA

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EISA’s Executive Director, **Mr Denis Kadima** delivered the official opening of EISA’s 13th annual Symposium titled ‘Realising Democratic Gains Through Social Cohesion in Africa’. Mr Kadima highlighted some of the contributions made by previous EISA annual symposiums on African institutions of governance and electoral democracy. Mr Kadima emphasised EISA’s interest in exploring social cohesion in Africa as being key to one of the EISA’s objectives of realising human rights and democratic participation within a peaceful African environment. Mr Kadima also made reference to EISA’s work in transitional elections/democracies in Africa as being pivotal to contributing to national cohesion.

Mr Kadima warned that high levels of cohesion do not necessarily lead to more democracy, or vice versa. He also emphasised that social cohesion should not be confused with democracy or development, because some societies could be socially cohesive but not democratic and vice versa. Mr Kadima described a tendency where many “second-generation” elections in transitional states regress with regards to democratic procedures and norms. Governance, in such cases, begins to exhibit low levels of democratic participation between citizens and state, with governance often characterised by a weak desire by citizens to engage in democratic processes.

Mr Kadima stressed the importance of working towards curbing what is referred to as the ‘global regression of democracy’ and hoped that the Symposium would provide a productive experience for academics and practitioners present to contribute to knowledge and discourse regarding the relationship between social cohesion, democracy and elections in Africa.

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**2 DEFINING SOCIAL COHESION**

2.1 **DEFINING SOCIAL COHESION**

**Prof Justine Burns’s** presentation on ‘Defining Social Cohesion’ set out to provide a working definition for social cohesion in South Africa. Prof Burns first highlighted the problem of defining the concept of social cohesion, as well as its connection to democracy. She noted that social cohesion is a contested concept with multiple meanings, thus making it a quasi-concept.

On the problem of defining social cohesion, Prof Burns argued that existing definitions of social cohesion in the literature are context specific and thus cannot be generalised. However, these definitions differ only by small strands of emphasis. Definitions of social cohesion tend to share some broad commonalities such as the importance of group
relationships (the inter-groups, intra-groups, personal relationships within societies) and the relationships between the citizens and the state.

Prof Burns compared cohesion to the physical structure of a vase where parts are stuck together (cohesion) or fall apart (lack of cohesion). Prof Burns noted that there may be different ways in which a structure (society) may fall apart: (a) the society could fracture into a myriad of individual smaller pieces making an atomised society (very individualistic with no group affiliation); (b) a structure (society) could fracture into groups or a number of smaller sub-components, such as a divided society with distinct groups of people). Prof Burns argued that cohesion is the extent to which the distinct parts (sub-groups) of the structure (society) come together. Although, different mechanisms may be used to bring the sub-groups together, cohesion should be a voluntary process that is not as a result of a coercive state (imposed cohesion) or because of market forces where self-interest and exchange play a role. Prof Burns explained that although the market may have a role to play when it comes to social cohesion, the market fails to explain all the processes of social cohesion. The presentation argued that social cohesion is realisable and that there are many ways of attaining social cohesion.

On the link between democracy and social cohesion, Prof Burns argued that social cohesion does not necessarily mean an egalitarian or democratic state or even that social cohesion only happens in democratic states. Furthermore, social cohesion can also occur in hierarchical state systems. Prof Burns also noted that a definition of social cohesion should avoid specifying what the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state should be.

Prof Burns offered the following working definition of the term “social cohesion”:

“Social Cohesion is the extent to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion or purely self-interested motivation.”

Prof Burns argued that people prefer to be cooperative rather than to be co-opted. Since people are cooperative, they may have shared values and norms. The definition emphasises similar traits to other definitions of social cohesion including solidarity, shared norms, common goals etc. This definition, however, avoids making normative statements about what cohesive societies should look like.

2.2 CONSTRUCTING COHESIVE SOCIETIES: NATION BUILDING EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA

Mr Richard Cornwall’s presentation, which investigated nation building experiments in Africa, argued that social cohesion has been most notable when people have a common grievance or fear. This was particularly clear during the colonial and post-colonial/post-independence period in Africa. He argued that the model of the modern African state was inherited from colonialism. He also highlighted the fact that post-colonial states in Africa inherited artificial borders and territories that did not exist before colonialism, causing issues with regards to lack of social cohesion. Mr Cornwall argued that the
nationalist class that governed the African state at independence did little to change the status quo of colonialism for people on the ground.

On the welfare state, Mr Cornwell maintained that the concept of the colonial state is new to African people, whose governance has historically been organised through smaller local groups. The colonial state changed the way African societies lived, as societies based on kinship allegiance and spiritual allegiance to that of an impersonal state. Mr Cornwell noted that most African states are incapable of providing basic services to people, resulting in the emergence of “failed states”. Such states are not typically governed within the parameters of the formal state. These societies are oftentimes under the rule of informal governments, armies, warlords/gangs where they may have their own unique type of social cohesion.

With regards to the building of a national identity in Africa; as previously stated, the impersonal state is foreign to the African continent. This type of state has historically been perceived as an artificial entity that threatens traditional leadership. Traditional African societies are governed through smaller groupings such as clans, tribes or people of the same ethnic identity, which binds social life to a small particularity of identity. He argues that social experiments that are designed to build national identity on the identity of a state had generally failed to unite African people. However, other such attempts had succeeded, Tanzania for instance created its national identity based on traditional African values. In other countries, attempts to create national identities based on a constitution caused identity problems for ethnic and religious groups in countries such as Sudan and Nigeria, as their constitutions failed to reconcile identities with a unified state identity.

Mr Cornwell concluded that social cohesion in African societies should mean cultural stability wherein differences can be tolerated and embraced.

2.3 MEASURING AND ASSESSING SOCIAL COHESION IN AFRICAN SOCIETIES

Ms Kate Lefko-Everett, highlighted the conceptual difficulties of defining social cohesion. She argued that social cohesion is not a Western concept, rather she related the term ‘social cohesion’ with African concepts such as ‘Ubuntu’, which broadly refers to altruism, respect, hospitality and reciprocity. Ms Lefko-Everett argued that social cohesion is promoted as a policy/development goal and is often a focus for governments – often used as a synonym for good governance. Ms Lefko-Everett noted that social cohesion as a policy has been promoted in South Africa since 2004 in the National Development Plan, Vision 2030 and the Medium Plan for Strategic framework for 2014-2019. Kenya has also promoted social cohesion as a policy plan for peace and reconciliation in the National Integration and Cohesion Commission following the 2007/2008 election related violence.

Ms Lefko-Everett however noted that social cohesion might not fit every society. The concept can also be misappropriated and used as a quasi-concept and thus adapted for various political purposes. The measurement of cohesion in African societies can be difficult because the boundaries of measuring social cohesion in multicultural
societies can be arbitrarily defined, whereas the local population may have a different understanding of the concept.

Bearing these challenges in mind, she outlined the steps that researchers and development policy practitioners should consider in developing a measurement of social cohesion:

1. Identify the dimension of social cohesion and the conceptual components that go into the definition.
2. Identify indicators of the key components i.e. the subjective and objective indicators.
3. Identify the data sources available—in national statistics and global surveys.
4. Construct a measurement.
5. Collect and report on the data that is available.

Ms Lefko-Everett explained that there are narrow and broad measurement tools that can be used to measure social cohesion. The broad measure can provide a comprehensive picture of social cohesion, because it measures different cohesion indicators which might be interpersonal relationships equality; trust in institutions; educational achievements; access to the internet; basic living standards; access to education and water; experience of discrimination; and whether or not there is a feeling of belonging. The narrow measure is specific and potentially limits other key indicators and dimensions of social cohesion.

Social cohesion can be measured using either subjective or objective data tools, which may be available as qualitative or quantitative information. Objective data is the information that is internationally or nationally available through statistics agencies. While subjective data is the information that is provided as public opinions, surveys, policy and research. She noted that some countries and institutions have developed national and multiple country indexes that may be used to obtain information on social cohesion. These include the Afro-Barometer (multiple countries index), the Kenyan Social Cohesion Index (2007/2008) and UCT’s Social Cohesion Index in South Africa (national index).

In closing, Ms Lefko-Everett noted that there is no global measure of social cohesion, although a global framework exists. She strongly argued in favour of developing new, locally developed measure. She said global or multiple country indexes may not be accurate for every country as societies may have different interpretation of social cohesion. Global measures have challenges in finding comparable objective data and are subject to the availability of funding.
3 SOCIETAL INTERACTIONS AND INFORMAL DEMOCRACY

3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE MENA REGION

Mr Ebrahim Deen presented a paper that investigated the development of social capital in the MENA region (Libya, Tunisia and Egypt) by referencing Robert Patton’s theory of social capital. Mr Deen argued that the MENA region has many structural problems which undermine the development of social capital between the social groups. Contrary to developing social capital, social groups compete for a dominant ideology that overrides others. He dismissed claims that social capital developed in the MENA region during the Arab Spring, stating that the Arab Spring had failed to develop a civic culture within the affected societies.

Mr Deen argued that if social capital is defined as the benefits (political, economic, and social) that one obtains from being part of a group, then there is a problem in assuming that the government can be removed from social life and citizens’ interactions organised as civic interaction, because civic organisations within societies are always in conflict with one another and with the state. He suggested that, ultimately social capital becomes contested by groups within the state. He further argued that the development of social capital in the MENA region was voluntary, hence it failed to result in the development of civic participation and associations after the Arab Spring. Social networks that grew out of the Arab Spring were not voluntary, instead they gained support from external actors (notably the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). He further suggested that these external actors who supported the protest during the Arab Spring feared genuine civic participation. As a result, ISIS began to undermine any development of civic participation by funding counter-revolutions.

Mr Deen suggested that the organisation of the state in the MENA region is different from that of other regions and countries. Governments in the MENA region are less responsive to their citizens. He explained that civic participation can exist without social capital (trust, values and networks). This is evident in Libya and Tunisia where the youth are involved in politics by joining paramilitary groups and the Islamic state.

3.2 INCLUSIVE GOVERNANCE IN TRANSITIONAL SPACES: CASE STUDIES FROM KENYA AND SOUTH SUDAN

Mr Grant Masterson presented findings from a study undertaken by EISA in partnership with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the Oslo Center, in Kenya and South Sudan. The study sought to examine citizens’ sense of inclusion in government processes at the local level within societies that are undergoing a transition.

The study explored both Kenyan and South Sudanese citizens’ experience of inclusion in government processes and its impact on national citizens. The study revealed that the sense of inclusion in government processes varied between communities and
within communities. Because communities in societies are not homogenous, social schisms are visible in communities’ perceptions of inclusion, hence inclusion is strongly shared by different ethnic groups when they can identify government representatives who share the same identity as theirs.

The study found that inclusion is enhanced when citizens witnessed tangible development. Infrastructure development is another important measure of inclusion in both Kenya and South Sudan. The presence of functioning streetlights, roads and the provision of water all contributed to an elevated sense of inclusion for local communities. The research also revealed that citizens are not easily misled by political populism when they can see the tangible benefits of development.

In Kenya, the devolution process has increased citizens’ sense of inclusion as representatives are closer to the people and hence failure to deliver services becomes more obvious between different counties. In South Sudan, inclusion was expressed in the need for security to stabilize the country as well as by transforming the society through the 2015 Peace Accord. Since that is not yet realized, people in South Sudan felt excluded from the political processes.

The study revealed that access to information and clear communication is vital during the transition processes and is particularly important for managing the expectations of citizens during the transitional period.

3.3 DEMOCRATIC REGRESSION: DECONSTRUCTING THE VENEER OF MAURITIAN SOCIAL COHESION

Prof Sheila Bunwaree’s presentation examined social cohesion in Mauritius. She contradicted the popular view that assumes Mauritius as a model of both social cohesion and development. She argued that the Mauritian government is excluding some sectors of the population. As Mauritius fails to shift from an electoral procedural democracy to a substantive democracy capable of creating equal opportunities and inclusion for all citizens, social cohesion is undermined. Prof Bunwaree suggested that the failure of the government to transform the economy resulted in high levels of exclusion.

Prof Bunwaree suggested that the point of departure for measuring social cohesion should be to investigate the patterns of inclusion and exclusion in Mauritius. This would allow for an understanding of how different segments of Mauritian society interpret inclusion or exclusion in political and economic activities of the country, and how this will further impact national cohesion. Prof Bunwaree discussed the history of the country and the ethnic makeup of the communities - which is pivotal for a deeper understanding of patterns of inclusion and exclusion in Mauritius. Mauritius is a multi-ethnic community whose origin forms part of the history of slavery with no history of indigenous people. To some degree, Mauritians are excluded from each other, living in ‘harmonious separation’ which is a threat to social cohesion as identity politics can divide the social groups along racial lines (Indo-Mauritians, Creoles, Chinese and Whites). She argues that historical divisions of race and ethnicity are still very much intact within Mauritius public and private institutions. As such, voting patterns tends
to follow a similar pattern. On building cohesion within ethnically and culturally diverse Mauritius, she argues that economic development could be a unifying feature – where those currently experiencing economic, social and political exclusion are one of the primary beneficiaries of such economic development.

4 SOCIAL COHESION IN A GLOBALISING WORLD

4.1 LARGE SCALE MIGRATION AND SOCIAL COHESION: LESSONS FROM SWEDISH AND GERMAN INTEGRATION POLICIES

Dr Tina Goldschmidt’s presentation investigated the impact of large-scale migration and integration policies on social cohesion in European countries – particularly Germany and Sweden. She described how these European states are adapting their policies and political discourse towards those of the far-right.

Dr Goldschmidt defined “social cohesion” as trust in the state - people’s willingness to co-operate across group boundaries, or the willingness to share resources in the welfare state and/ or the willingness to show solidarity with members of other groups. Dr Goldschmidt noted that large scale migration into Germany and Sweden is portrayed as a threat to ‘national cohesion’ - a view, she explained, is popular within far-right political parties but is often misleading. She argued that the impact of migration alone is not a good measure of social cohesion. The nation state could have multiple social groupings and divisions which play an important role in the discussion about social cohesion. Nevertheless, far-right political parties continue to blame immigrants for all the social ills and advance arguments around the loss of majority culture, the erosion of the welfare state, high crime rates and increased levels of poverty. Dr Goldschmidt explained that flawed arguments like these should not be taken lightly because the media and the political elite play a critical role in the political discourse around immigrants.

Dr Goldschmidt explained how the governments of Sweden and Germany had introduced comprehensive social, economic and cultural integration policies to accommodate foreign nationals and promote a sense of social cohesion. She noted that some of these integration policies have succeeded, while others failed or have been criticised for achieving unintended consequences.

The structural policies in both Sweden and Germany have not worked because is it still difficult for immigrants to participate in the economies of the respective countries. Sweden and Germany both have high rates of unemployment for foreign nationals. While Sweden has a high level of access to state social assistance for foreign nationals, there remains a low labour participation rate of immigrants because the country has legal barriers which prevent asylum seekers from entering the labour market. The application of asylum seekers to work in Germany is a long process and the labour laws
restrict asylum seekers from working without an asylum permit. Although Sweden has a shorter processing time for applications for asylum seekers, foreign nationals are generally hired as cheap labour. These countries also have low accreditation for foreign qualifications. Immigrants are classified as ‘low skilled’ even if they hold a foreign qualification. Germany has strict rules for applying for accreditation of foreign qualifications to the point that German state employees themselves sometimes don’t understand these rules. Importantly, Dr Goldschmidt noted that political integration remains limited. Foreign nationals are restricted from voting for the national government and are only able to vote for representation on the immigrant council. Immigrants are generally found to be influential in their home country’s politics.

4.2 SOUTH AFRICA’S GLOBAL OBLIGATIONS IN FOSTERING NATIONAL COHESION

Ms Nicole Fritz examined the extent to which South Africa’s global obligations are fostering national cohesion. She argued that the South African government has regressed from its constitutional and foreign policy obligations which are based on the idea of promoting and protecting human rights and creating a fairer world order. She noted the example of South Africa voting against the United Nations Resolution on Human rights in 2015. South Africa also chose to abstain from a vote condemning human rights violations in Myanmar and Palestine and Israel. Closer to home, she states that South Africa has failed in its obligation to protect others, specifically foreign nationals living in the country against several waves of xenophobic attacks. She argued that embracing diversity has benefits for both democracy and social cohesion. This is of particular importance in providing solutions to South Africa’s experience with its multiple identities and its history of exclusion.

4.3 REGIONAL RESPONSES TO MIGRATION INTEGRATION FRAMEWORKS

Ms Otillia Anna Maunganidze’s presentation examined African regional mechanisms and frameworks for the integration of immigrants in Africa. She described the African Union’s comprehensive protocol on the free movement of people and migration, noting however, that migration in some African states is affected by structural problems. She further argued that the legacy of colonialism still plays a role in defining peoples’ identities and crafting an image of ‘otherness’ thus resulting in the exclusion and separation of social groups.

Ms Maunganidze noted that the reasons for migration within Africa vary from the search for economic opportunities to fleeing areas of conflict. Nevertheless, migration is still affected by the failure of African states and regions to develop integration policies to accommodate members of different African nationalities. She attributed the emergence of xenophobia to the way in which nationalism is defined in Africa; it is centred on entitlement, native identity and perception of difference to others who don’t share the same identity. The migration of people to wealthier economic countries is perceived as negative, having little benefit to the host nation which, she argues, is untrue.

Ms Maunganidze recommends that states develop appropriate structural integration policies which could respond to these related immigration issues. She noted that there
are some good practices where countries have developed comprehensive integration frameworks to mitigate migration issues in their societies. Ethiopia has a refugee response framework to integrate refugees into its society whereas Uganda has a land policy that allows South Sudanese refugees to farmland.

Ms Maunganidze described how the African Union provides a comprehensive Migration Policy Framework for African states. She noted that the Regional Economic Communities have developed regional policies and frameworks that allow people to use their visas to visit countries for a limited period. These include the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). She criticised existing policies for biases against people.

5 THE STATE AND SOCIAL COHESION

5.1 POLARISED SOCIETIES: ECONOMIC DISPARITY, SOCIAL COHESION AND DEMOCRACY

Mr Michael O’Donovan examined the correlation between disparities in equality and social inclusion in democratic governance in Africa. His presentation used statistical data to measure the impact of inequality (equality of incomes) on democracy, since inequalities tend to be associated with negative outcomes, for instance democratic apathy. Mr O’Donovan argued that there is no empirical evidence for the presumed correlation between economic inequality and democratic participation, as post-modernists have asserted. Using Afro-barometer data, his presentation revealed that democratic participation tends to be higher among members of community groups (churches and political organization) (72%). People belonging to such groups showed a 10 percent higher interest in voting, compared to people who are not part of community groups. This would suggest that strong perceptions of social inclusion lead to increased participation in the democratic processes.

Mr O’Donovan went on to mention that countries with high levels of economic inequalities such as Namibia, Botswana and South Africa tend to have high preference for democracy compared to other forms of government. Whilst societies emerging from conflicts tend to have no particular support for any form of governance style. He suggested that the Gini coefficient as a measure of income inequality is not a good indicator of support for democracy, since poorer and wealthier countries can have the same level of Gini coefficient. He also argued that any measure of the impact of inequality on democracy should demonstrate a difference between inequality and poverty.

He further noted that high levels of equality do not necessarily lead to more democratic participation, but rather that high levels of equality and the same level of education could result in the same rate of voter participation.
5.2 THE EFFECT OF TAXATION ON SOCIAL MOBILISATION AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

Ms Vanessa van den Boogard’s presentation explored the effect of taxation on social mobilisation and democratic governance. She outlined the benefits of taxation on good governance and social cohesion, noting that taxation can lead to increased political participation as citizens are more likely to hold government to account and, in turn, government accountability provides incentives for tax compliance. She further identified a positive association between social cohesion and taxation, suggesting that socially cohesive societies may be able to introduce progressive tax laws and implement these fairly. Alternately, inequality and a lack of social cohesion may reduce trust in the state thereby lowering tax morale. Ultimately, low tax revenue may impose constraints on the state social spending required to enhance social cohesion and tax morale. In contrast, in cases where governments are reliant on foreign aid or natural resources (such as oil and minerals) rather than taxation of citizens to fund state activities, there tends to be no fiscal social contract between citizens and the state, leading to less accountable governance.

Ms Van den Boogard further highlighted that in cases where governments extract more tax revenue from citizens while adding little value in terms of improved public welfare, there is likely to be apathy from citizens as well as lower levels of trust in the government. She further noted that the emphasis on taxation as a way of improving governance is relatively new in Africa. The debates around taxation and good governance, as well as greater tax activism by civil society are, however, gaining traction as the middle class on the continent grows. Several African countries have introduced taxation as means of promoting tax justice laws including Rwanda, Uganda and South Africa.

6 ELECTIONS AND SOCIAL COHESION

6.1 SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Prof Rod Alence’s presentation examined social structures and popular support for democracy in Africa, interrogating the premise that strong socio-economic foundations correlate to stable democracies globally. He noted that there is an assumption that democratic participation is stronger in societies where citizens have the perception of social mobility, where there is a large middle class, and high levels of education and industrialization. The underlying assumption is that economically developed societies tend to have higher democratic participation than less economically developed states. He argued that economic development tends to create political moderation and that a strong perception of social mobility leads to a greater sense of tolerance.

In exploring the resilience of the African democracies, he argued that classical theories
suggest that socio-economic foundations alone can provide a stable ground for
democratic participation are inadequate. Professor Alence raised concerns about
applying these same socio-economic theories in the African context partly because
many African states: (i) have a high level of dependency on aid and donations; (ii)
have generally low levels of economic growth; (iii) remain primary producers of raw
materials; and (iv) have horizontal social cleavages. He noted that African societies
support democracy as well as the various features of democratic governance and
African societies tend to have strong consensus against elite transgression of democratic
norms and values.

6.2 THE RETURN OF HISTORY: IDENTITY POLITICS AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Prof Peter Kagwanja emphasised that democracy is facing a crisis globally. He noted
that the ‘death of democracy’ could be traced back to three historical phases. The first
phase, between 1989-2005, was the triumph of the repro-democracy ie. exporting
democracy to Africa and other parts of the globe. The second phase, between 2005-
2015, was the “Return of History” during which economic recession highlighted the
failure of African democracies to deliver on their promises of economic prosperity,
freedom and security. This, combined with the rise of China, began to raise scepticism
around the positive connection between democracy and development, given China’s
development without democracy.

Prof Kagwanja argued that there is no positive relationship between democracy and
development, suggesting that democracy and development are, in fact, conceptually
unrelated. He argued that democracy is about the vote and that development is about
the market, the individual and wealth. In Africa, democracy (vote) and the market
(capitalism) resulted in the inability of states to share resources which has meant that
the African state has failed in consolidating democracy.

The third phase, the popularity of structural adjustment policies has promoted
capitalism and democracy, thus creating a new phase of repro-democracy and
capitalism, noticeable by the rise of Donald Trump. In this new phase of democratisation,
authoritarian states have also risen in power and are creating allies in developing
countries (Chinese and Russian investment in Africa being a case in point). The debate
is no longer about democracy but about development and the market.

On identity politics, Professor Kagwanja argues that colonialism imported democracy
as a new concept to Africa. However, he noted that democracy by consensus existed
in Africa before colonialism. This African democracy of consensus was eroded by
colonialism and was replaced by entrenched liberal values which created two kinds of
spaces for public participation, the civic and the moral. Furthermore, Prof Kagwanja
claims that, resulting from the third wave of democracy, democratic forms rather
than substantive democracy, became normative. African countries have become
“electoralism” (halfway to democracy and authoritarianism), thus failing to transform
into democracies. The effect of this is seen in the perception that elections are
only another way for elites to wield state power as opposed to a way of advancing
democracy. For African governments, participating in elections has become a fashion,
a zero-sum game that divides people rather than unites them.

Prof Kagwanja noted that countries emerging from conflict have different experiences when it comes to promoting democracy and social cohesion. South Africa has been described as a success story while countries like Burundi and Rwanda continue to battle with deep structural problems. In Rwanda, ethnic formulas for parliamentary representation are not working because they do not address the fundamental crisis of the state. To counter deep structural crisis, African states which emerged from conflict need to develop solutions based on the extent of the structural crisis. He used the Kenyan experience of dealing with issues of exclusion following the 2007/2008 election related conflict, noting that development of the new Constitution (2010) (i) the adoption of power sharing (ii) the devolution and restructuring of all levels of government from national to local (iii) wealth sharing that distributed 15% of wealth to local government whereas (iv) historically disadvantaged areas started contributing to a more inclusive government.

Prof Kagwanja, however, noted that increasing social cohesion has not necessarily promoted democracy; while Kenya has stabilised, the country has become a democratic centralist state led by an elite and opposition parties who have been co-opted into government, thus being unable to act as watchdogs over the government.

7 CLOSING

Mr Miguel De Brito, drew the Symposium to a close, providing a summary of the main points raised over the two days as well as some lessons highlighting the following themes:

- Democracy and cohesion.
- Engagement and participation.
- Globalisation and migration.
- Inclusion and exclusion.
- Elections.

He highlighted issues of definitional clarity raised by several presenters around the concept of ‘social cohesion’. He noted that the primary definition provided – “Social Cohesion is the extent to which people are co-operative, within and across group boundaries, without coercion or purely self-interested motivation” – is problematic and that the real motivation for people to co-operate is under-explored. He noted that there can be many factors causing people to co-operate, including non-democratic ones. This Symposium provides further opportunity for exploration and research in this field.

On behalf of EISA, De Brito thanked the delegates for participating in the discussion at the EISA Symposium and wished them a safe journey home.
STATE CAPTURE AS AN OBSTACLE TO
DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN AFRICA

THE 12th EISA ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM
Wanderers Club, Illovo, Johannesburg, South Africa
28 and 29 November 2017

Charles Njoroge

EAC
Kenya